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ABSTRACT
This Article offers a process-based method to assess Internet
censorship that is compatible with different value sets about what
content should be blocked. Whereas China’s Internet censorship
receives considerable attention, censorship in the United States and
other democratic countries is largely ignored. The Internet is
increasingly fragmented by nations’ different value judgments about
what content is unacceptable. Countries differ not in their intent to
censor material—from political dissent in Iran to copyrighted songs in
America—but in the content they target, how precisely they block it,
and how involved their citizens are in these choices. Previous scholars
have analyzed Internet censorship from values-based perspectives,
sporadically addressing key principles such as openness,
transparency, narrowness, and accountability. This Article is the first
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to unite these principles into a coherent methodology. Drawing upon
scholarship in deliberative democracy, health policy, labor standards,
and cyberlaw, this Article applies this new framework to contentious
debates about sales of censorship technology by Western companies,
public law regulation of these transactions, and third-party analysis of
Internet censorship.
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It’s taken governments a long time to realize that you don’t need to
manipulate unwelcome news. Just don’t show it.
– P.D. James, THE CHILDREN OF MEN

1

INTRODUCTION
How can legal scholars make normative distinctions among
Saudi Arabia’s decision to censor Internet pornography, China’s
efforts to suppress political dissent online, and America’s moves to
filter illegal MP3 files from the Web? Is it acceptable for Cisco to sell
networking gear to China, knowing that it will be used to block
2
dissident views, or for Verizon to drop Usenet newsgroups at the
3
New York State Attorney General’s behest? Whereas China’s
Internet censorship receives considerable attention, censorship in the
United States and other democratic countries is largely ignored. The
Internet’s increasing fragmentation, driven by technological
censorship, derives from different value judgments made by countries
about the relative importance of free expression, protection of
minority interests, concern for societal cohesion, and other goals. The
common thread, though, is censorship: most countries use cybersieves
to try to filter undesirable content and make it disappear from the
Web. Whether it is copyrighted songs in America or political dissent
in Iran, the goal is the same; only the targeted material varies.
Countries differ not in their intent to limit access to material online,
but in the content they ban, the precision of their blocking, and the
voice they offer citizens in decisionmaking. This Article offers a new,
4
process-based method to measure the legitimacy of these efforts,

1. P.D. James, THE CHILDREN OF MEN 123 (1992).
2. See Sarah Lai Stirland, Cisco Leak: “Great Firewall” of China Was a Chance to Sell
More Routers, WIRED, May 20, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/leaked-ciscodo.html.
3. See Danny Hakim, 3 Net Providers Will Block Sites with Child Sex, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2008, at A1; see also Declan McCullagh, N.Y. Attorney General Forces ISPs to Curb Usenet
Access, CNET NEWS, June 10, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9964895-38.html
(quoting statements from Time Warner Cable and Verizon that they would block Usenet
groups but not Web sites).
4. While there are multiple normative positions on legitimacy, this Article argues for a
process-based approach that embodies an increasingly universal set of governance norms, as
embodied in documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Authoritarian
countries tend to adhere outwardly to the forms of process-based governance, even if their
actions contravene its substance. I argue that process-based legitimacy maps sufficiently well
onto widely shared norms that it should enjoy analytical primacy, and that it is likely to be the
most helpful tool for multiple actors with different values-based agendas.
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advancing debate about the balance between information sharing and
5
control on the Internet, and about how that balance is struck. Its
analytical framework is compatible with divergent views on what
material should be banned, strengthening norms-based assessments.
Scholars who have addressed Internet filtering have approached
the issue from multiple values-based perspectives. But this Article is
the first to recognize that values-based analysis is unhelpful in a world
of pervasive Internet censorship and to offer an integrated
methodology for evaluating how decisions about online information
controls are made. This new framework examines critically the
processes of Internet censorship to evaluate how well a country
describes what it censors and why, whether it effectively blocks
proscribed material while leaving permitted content untouched, and
how much its citizens can participate in filtering decisions. Because
online censorship is sharply on the rise worldwide—in democratic
6
7
states as well as in authoritarian ones —corporations, citizens, and
governments will increasingly be forced to make difficult judgments
8
about filtering practices.
Part I examines current approaches to Internet censorship and
details their shortcomings; it then introduces a process-based solution
(which this Article refers to as the “Framework”) and explores its
roots in contemporary legal thinking. Part II describes the
Framework’s four components, with examples from countries that
censor the Internet. Part III advocates development of competing
quantitative metrics to measure these components, and then explains
how the metrics can help resolve three contentious policy debates.
First, how should companies decide when to sell technology enabling

5. See generally John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle: The
Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End Principle, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
31 (2006) (describing recent changes in Internet regulation practices).
6. See, e.g., Danny O’Brien, Turkish Censor Lacks Others’ Subtle Touch, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2007, at 7 (noting that Great Britain and the European Union have expressed interest
in blocking access to terrorism materials).
7. Kevin Voigt, Internet Censorship Gathers Steam, CNN.COM, Apr. 24, 2007, http://
edition.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/04/18/online.censorship/index.html; see also Matthew Quirk,
The Web Police, ATL. MONTHLY, May 2006, at 50, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
doc/print/200605/chinese-internet (detailing widespread censorship in China, Iran, and other
authoritarian nations).
8. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Access Denied, 452 NATURE 155, 155 (2008); Christopher S.
Rugaber, Google Fights Global Internet Censorship, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/25/AR2007062500364_pf.html.
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a country’s censorship? Second, how should governments decide
whether to regulate these transactions using public law? Finally, how
can other nations, activists, and scholars evaluate countries’ online
information restrictions, such as when naming countries as human
10
rights violators? Part IV assesses the Framework’s challenges and
limitations, and the Article concludes with observations about the rise
of filtering worldwide.
I. THE INTERNETS
A. Series of Filtered Tubes
Current analytical approaches to Internet censorship are
inadequate to assess filtering that is increasingly ubiquitous. This
Section describes the problem of multiple Internets, explains why
extant theories are unworkable, and explains how the divergence of
norms around what content is and is not permissible challenges
filtering analysis.
11
There is no longer one Internet. Technological censorship by
countries worldwide means that how the Net appears depends upon
12
where you access it. In Beijing, one cannot reach sites criticizing the
13
Chinese Communist Party. In Mumbai, Internet Service Providers

9. See generally Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Reluctant Gatekeepers: Corporate
Ethics on a Filtered Internet, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL
INTERNET FILTERING 103 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that corporations
themselves are best positioned to take the lead in establishing a code of conduct); Press Release,
Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Companies, Human Rights Groups, Investors, Academics and
Technology Leaders to Address International Free Expression and Privacy Challenges (Jan. 18,
2007), http://www.cdt.org/press/20070118press-humanrights.php (announcing a meeting of
various stakeholders “to seek solutions to the free expression and privacy challenges faced by
technology and communications companies doing business internationally”).
10. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/ (describing individual
countries’ human rights advances and setbacks within a democratic government framework).
11. See Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 9,
at 1, 2–4.
12. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (2006)
(describing the success of governments in controlling Internet access and content).
13. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA 17 (2009),
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_2009.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—2007: CHINA (2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100518.htm (describing China’s human rights practices
generally, including Internet censorship); James Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset,”
ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 2008, at 64, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinesefirewall.
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(ISPs) block the religious extremist Web site Hindu Unity. A user
searching Google for “stormfront” in Paris will see the game
15
designers’ site, but not that of the white supremacist group. From
Boston, someone looking for copyrighted music files may find them
16
removed from search engines or host sites. The decision to hold the
2008 Summer Olympic Games in the People’s Republic of China
17
focused attention—and criticism—on China’s online restrictions, but
18
19
20
21
22
other countries such as Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Australia, New
23
24
Zealand, and Brazil also censor cyberspace. Increasingly, countries

14. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INDIA 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/india.
pdf; see also Nart Villeneuve, Evasion Tactics, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Nov. 2007, at 71, 76.
15. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Google Excluding Controversial Sites, CNET NEWS, Oct.
23, 2002, http://www.news.com/2100-1023-963132.html. See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE,
EUROPE (2007), http://opennet.net/research/regions/Europe (describing filtering practices by
category in European countries).
16. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 622 (2006). See generally Google, Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, http://www.google.com/dmca.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009)
(describing policies for removing infringing sites or material).
17. See, e.g., Edward Cody, IOC Allows China to Limit Reporters’ Access to Internet,
WASH. POST, July 31, 2008, at A10 (describing Olympic journalists finding certain Web content
blocked); I.O.C. Member Accuses Committee of Betrayal on Censorship Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2008, at D7 (same); Andrew Jacobs, Beijing Games Denying Media Full Use of Web, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A1 (same).
18. See generally Anick Jesdanun, Is It Censorship or Protection?, WASH. POST, July 20,
2008, at A3 (describing censorship practices of various ISPs and Web sites).
19. Iran Launches Fresh Crackdown on Websites: Report, AFP, May 20, 2008, http://afp.
google.com/article/ALeqM5jgPmlgFydl8ifBE-OLsLXcyQYUgg. But see JOHN KELLY &
BRUCE ETLING, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, HARVARD UNIV. PUB. NO. 2008-01,
MAPPING IRAN’S ONLINE PUBLIC: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE PERSIAN BLOGOSPHERE 21
(2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_
Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf (noting researchers’ “surprise that such a large
proportion of that part of the blogosphere, which the regime must consider oppositional, is in
fact visible within Iran”).
20. Indonesia Seeks to Block YouTube over Anti-Koran Film, REUTERS, Apr. 2, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSSP23588120080402.
21. See, e.g., J. Mark Lytle, Internet Censorship Body Swings into Action, TECHRADAR
UK, July 4, 2008, http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/web/internet-censorship-bodyswings-into-action-415849 (describing filtering of sites accessible to minors via mobile phones).
22. Derek E. Bambauer, Filtering in Oz: Australia’s Foray into Internet Censorship, 31 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319466.
23. Jacqui Cheng, New Zealand Moves Forward with Child Porn Filtering System, ARS
TECHNICA, July 17, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/new-zealand-movesforward-with-child-porn-filtering-system.ars.
24. Google in Deal with Brazil to Fight Child Porn, REUTERS, July 2, 2008, http://www.
reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSN0237672120080702.
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use computer technology to block access to prohibited content—a
25
practice known as Internet “filtering.” Their objective is to shape
26
citizens’ information environments and thereby alter behavior. A
persistent challenge for Internet law scholars has been to define a set
27
of criteria to evaluate the legitimacy of such restrictions. These
efforts, however, are unsatisfactory in addressing filtering that is ever
more common and more technologically sophisticated. Pioneers such
28
29
as John Perry Barlow
and John Gilmore
advocate
cyberlibertarianism, arguing that nothing should be blocked, and that
perhaps nothing can be blocked. Amitai Etzioni has written that
implementing localized standards is technically possible and
30
desirable, particularly to protect minors. Cheryl Preston has sought
31
filtering of “harmful” content based on American norms. David
Johnson and David Post look to Internet-specific forms of democratic
32
organization to resolve the question. Thomas Schultz supports
filtering to protect a country’s core values, based on social contract
33
theory and a Hegelian state that embodies collective will. Kevin
Werbach opposes filtering because of censorship’s threat “to the
34
structure and universality of the Internet.”

25. See generally Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 11, at 2 (defining “filtering”).
26. Filtering is information regulation via code—computer hardware and software—rather
than law, though its technical measures are frequently backed by legal mandates. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 24, 121–32 (2006) (describing modes of regulation).
27. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Women in the Web of Secondary Copyright Liability and Internet
Filtering, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 449, 481–87 (2005) (noting that filtering criteria reflect broader
patterns of gender and social power).
28. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), available
at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. But see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Does
Power Grow Out of the Barrel of a Modem? Some Thoughts on Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s
Who Controls the Internet?, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 432, 433 (2007) (“Barlow’s vision of a
separate and untouchable cybersphere is increasingly unrealistic.”).
29. Gilmore famously stated that “[t]he Net interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it.” Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 62.
30. See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 50–
52 (2004).
31. See Cheryl B. Preston, Making Family-Friendly Internet a Reality: The Internet
Community Ports Act, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1471, 1483–85.
32. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1391–1402 (1996).
33. Thomas Schultz, Carving Up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders and the
Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 799, 806 (2008).
34. Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and
the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 367 (2008).
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These approaches have significant shortcomings. Some
approaches treat restrictions as binary—either all-pervasive
censorship or an unlimited marketplace of ideas. Other approaches
canonize one normative view of content as ideal: banning hate speech
is bad, but blocking pornography is desirable. And some approaches
defer to local standards without offering methods to assess them.
Searching for a robust evaluative methodology has particular salience
35
given the surge in efforts to filter the Internet in the United States —
36
for example, suggestions that ISPs should filter copyrighted material,
37
pornography should be segregated onto a separate “channel,” or
38
ISPs should limit subscribers’ access to Web sites or Usenet news
39
40
groups (on topics from SCUBA diving to radio astronomy ) to
41
reduce distribution of child pornography. Current theoretical
approaches to Internet filtering falter when confronted with
censorship by democratic countries.
Moreover, although these countries increasingly agree that
Internet users should be prevented from accessing certain content,
their norms regarding banned content vary widely. There is scant
agreement on what material ought to be off-limits—that is, material
whose viewing should be blocked proactively rather than punished
42
after the fact. This divergence makes it hard to assess filtering’s
legitimacy other than by whether the country blocks material one
43
finds objectionable and leaves other content accessible. Importing

35. The FCC, though, has punished ISPs that unilaterally filter, voting to require Comcast
not to block customers’ file-sharing traffic. E.g., John Dunbar, FCC Rules Against Comcast,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2008, at D2.
36. See Tim Wu, Has AT&T Lost Its Mind?, SLATE, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.slate.com/
id/2182152/.
37. Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online,
2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1426.
38. See Jasa Santos, Qwest Blocks Access to Known Child Porn Sites, CASPER STARTRIBUNE, July 7, 2008, available at http://www.trib.com/articles/2008/07/08/news/wyoming/8d7
cbb0a6413fa718725747e007d4326.txt.
39. E.g., Rec.scuba, http://groups.google.com/group/rec.scuba/topics.
40. E.g., IAC Indian Astronomy Club, http://groups.google.com/group/indianastronomy
club.
41. McCullagh, supra note 3.
42. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Beth S. Noveck & Kermit Roosevelt, Filtering the Internet—A Best
Practices Model, in PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN ON THE INTERNET: TOWARDS A NEW
CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 199, 210 (Jens Waltermann & Marcel Machill eds., 2000) (noting
the “wide cultural and ideological diversity” that filtering must reflect).
43. See generally Gordon Hull, Overblocking Autonomy: The Case of Mandatory Library
Filtering Software, 42 CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 81 (2009), available at http://www.springerlink.
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U.S. standards for content is unhelpful—the limited restrictions on
expression permitted by America’s Constitution are atypically
44
narrow. Many Americans would object to the United Arab
Emirates’ (UAE) decision to block all sites hosted in Israel’s top-level
45
domain; UAE citizens might object to the United States’ willingness
to tolerate sites offering pornography or endorsing alcohol
46
47
48
consumption. Britain and Canada filter child pornography, and
49
Australia is testing this approach, yet in Japan, possession of child
50
pornography is lawful. British defamation law prohibits more speech
than its American counterpart doctrine, despite their shared historical
51
roots. Anti-Semitic speech is permitted in Skokie but banned in
52
Toronto. Even U.S. standards vary by subject matter. American
government officials criticize search engines when they help censor

com/content/71742w01k1432463/fulltext.pdf (describing library filtering of pornography as the
construction of a space purged of “deviant” sexuality).
44. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Unlike Others, U.S. Defends Freedom to Offend in Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2008, at A1; Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment 23 (John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research Working Paper Group, Paper No. 05-021, 2005),
available at http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=167.
45. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 6
(2009), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_UAE_2009.pdf.
46. Id.
47. Martin Bright, BT Puts Block on Child Porn Sites, OBSERVER, June 6, 2004, at 7.
48. See Cybertip.ca, Cleanfeed Canada, http://cybertip.ca/app/en/cleanfeed (follow “Does
the system filter legitimate, non-child pornography sites? (show)” hyperlink) (last visited Oct.
23, 2009) (stating that Canada’s Cleanfeed system blocks “access to Internet addresses
specifically containing child pornography images”).
49. Bambauer, supra note 22, at 10.
50. Jake Adelstein, This Mob Is Big in Japan, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at B2 (noting
that producing or distributing child pornography, while illegal, is rarely investigated).
51. See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., [2003] EWHC (QB) 1162, [38]–[39] (Eng.);
Demon v. Godfrey Internet Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 201, 204 (Eng.) (explaining that under English
law, unlike in the United States, a defendant publisher has the burden of proving innocence).
Protections for reporting on issues of public interest, however, have expanded recently.
Jameel v. Wall St. J. Europe SPRL, [2006] UKHL 44 (U.K.); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers
Ltd., [2001] 2 AC 127, 176–77 (Eng.).
52. Compare Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1978) (per
curiam) (overturning an injunction prohibiting public display of “hatred against persons of
Jewish faith or ancestry”), with Can. (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892,
941 (Can.) (upholding a cease and desist order prohibiting telephone calls containing
“statements denigrating the Jewish race or religion”).
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53

political speech in China and when they fail to censor copyrighted
54
materials there.
Even in democratic countries, the types of content restricted and
the standards for doing so diverge. Comparing nations’ online
censorship from one normative perspective is unhelpful. Countries
with similar views on banning information fare well, and countries
with contrary attitudes fare poorly. Evaluators tend to approve of
like-minded thinkers. Restricting Internet information is a policy
question about choosing among multiple regulatory endpoints that
55
are both possible and legitimate. This dilemma—choosing among
divergent substantive values—parallels classic problems in American
constitutional law. Scholars such as Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely,
and Jeremy Waldron have come to a similar solution: turning from
the fight over normative choices to building consensus about the
56
process used to resolve that contest. Law’s historic focus on process
can serve debates over Internet censorship well. Thus, this Article
argues that to assess whether a given approach to censorship is
legitimate, legal scholars need an analytical tool that recognizes
different tradeoffs but enables rigorous comparative analysis.
B. A New Hope
This Article proposes an alternative methodology that addresses
these shortcomings: a process-oriented framework to evaluate the
legitimacy of Internet filtering. The approach draws upon scholarship
in deliberative democracy, health care decisionmaking, labor and
environmental law, and cyberlaw. To assess legitimacy, the
Framework asks four questions. First, is the country open about its
Internet censorship and why it restricts information? Second, is the
state transparent about what material it filters and what it leaves
untouched? Third, how narrow is the country’s filtering—that is, how
well does the content actually blocked and not blocked by filtering
correspond to the country’s filtering criteria? Finally, to what degree
can citizens participate in decisionmaking about these restrictions,
such that censors are accountable? Legitimate censorship is open,

53. See, e.g., Yahoo Criticized in Case of Jailed Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at C3.
54. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REP. 7, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (criticizing the Chinese
search engine Baidu).
55. I thank Peter Hammer for this point.
56. See infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.
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transparent about banned content, effective yet narrowly targeted,
and responsive to citizens’ preferences (but not overly so).
Evaluating legitimacy from a process-oriented perspective does
not replace values-driven normative analysis. Indeed, the Framework
bolsters process-oriented examinations by enabling application of
57
different normative models. If a state’s censorship program is openly
and fully described, carefully targeted, and responsive to popular
demand, then objections are properly aimed not at the state’s filtering
program, but at the country’s larger values and policy choices. For
example, Saudi Arabia might filter sites about minority faiths in a way
that is straightforward, narrow, and popular, yet one might still find
58
that decision unacceptable. The Framework’s goal is not to end
analysis or discussions based on values, but to spark and clarify them.
A process-based approach to this question best comports with the
diversity of views on banning Internet materials.
C. The Framework’s Roots
The Framework’s approach is rooted in the law’s historical
preoccupation with questions of process, and it parallels proposals
59
based on deliberative democracy in other contested policy areas.
Similar tools have been deployed when multiple legitimate outcomes
are possible and even likely, such as allocating health care and
regulating working conditions.
Process-based approaches often seek to mediate policy
disagreements based on strongly held values, with the goal of
convincing participants that an outcome is reasonable even if they
disagree with it. Consider a dying patient in the United States who
60
wants a health care plan to pay for experimental treatment. (Assume
that the treatment may have clinical benefit, but it has not been
proven effective.) The plan and the patient have different, competing

57. Jack Balkin, Beth Noveck, and Kermit Roosevelt propose an analogous method for
rating Web sites’ content via application of different third-party “templates.” See Balkin et al.,
supra note 42, at 210.
58. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: SAUDI ARABIA (2008),
http://hrw.org/wr2k8/pdfs/saudiarabia.pdf (assessing the human rights climate in Saudi Arabia).
59. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991) (analyzing
methods for combining political equality and deliberation); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999) (seeking to reconcile
human rights and political deliberation).
60. See Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care:
Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 27, 28.
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value sets. The plan seeks to ensure all its members have access to
scarce medical resources, discover new therapies through clinical
trials, and avoid negative public attention. The patient wants to
receive therapy that may extend her life, improve her life’s quality, or
cure a disease. There is no single way to balance these competing
claims; it may be reasonable to provide women with breast cancer
61
autologous bone marrow transplants but deny them access to
62
experimental cancer drugs (which may be highly toxic). The health
plan seeks outcomes that seem legitimate to affected patients, other
members, and the public.
Norman Daniels and James Sabin suggest that the keys to such
legitimacy are process-oriented: making decisions public; explaining
how decisions reasonably provide benefits to a heterogeneous group
of members given resource constraints; allowing appeal; and creating
63
regulation to enforce these factors. Daniels and Sabin extend the
proposal to all limit-setting decisions by providers such as health
management organizations (HMOs), arguing that decisionmaking
criteria should be public, relevant, and subject to challenge, such that
64
“all fair-minded parties” would agree they are germane. Patients or
health plan accountants may disagree with a particular outcome—
and, given their differing preferences and values, one side is likely to
do so—but they are more likely to accept the legitimacy of the
65
outcome if they trust how the decision was made. As with
censorship, allocating health care resources requires selecting from
multiple legitimate options. Outcome-based normative analysis is not
determinative, and so legitimacy must rest upon a process viewed as
relevant and fair.
Similarly, setting labor standards can result in multiple legitimate
outcomes that prioritize different interests and values. Under

61. But see Peter D. Jacobson, Richard A. Rettig & Wade M. Aubry, Litigating the Science
of Breast Cancer Treatment, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 785, 790 (2007) (noting that
randomized clinical trials showed transplants to be no more effective than standard
chemotherapy).
62. Cf. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 485
F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008) (finding no constitutional right
to access experimental therapies).
63. See generally Daniels & Sabin, supra note 60 (analyzing the allocation of benefits
among breast cancer patients).
64. Norman Daniels & James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care
Reform, 17 HEALTH AFF. 50, 57 (1998).
65. Id. at 59 (noting that with a legitimate process, “even those who say that the specific
outcome is wrong must admit that it is a case of reasonable disagreement”).
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pressure from activists, corporations have begun to adopt voluntary
66
codes of conduct for working conditions. These codes, while
oriented around the International Labour Organization’s principles,
differ significantly in their requirements for issues such as wages,
67
nondiscrimination, and freedom of association. Should factories pay
68
workers (at least) the legal minimum wage, or a living wage? May
they discriminate based on sexual orientation? (American federal
69
employment law permits such discrimination; however, French law
70
bans it. ) While participants tend to agree that labor regulation is
needed, they diverge about what rules are proper.
The Ratcheting Labor Standards (RLS) approach tackles this
heterogeneity by combining voluntary regulation, monitoring,
reporting, and external analysis to measure how well firms such as
71
Nike comply with their adopted code of conduct. Companies select
both the standards by which they are measured and the evaluator.
Analysis and public scrutiny assess what behavior suffices for
legitimacy and improve monitoring through feedback and
competition. RLS inherently accepts that more than one labor code
can be valid—standards for a factory in Vietnam will necessarily
72
differ from those in Vienna. Rather than assessing labor standards
from a single values-based perspective, RLS focuses on process: selfregulation, checked by monitoring and disclosure, with feedback to
refine standards, and thus develop legitimacy.

66. See generally Richard Locke et al., Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work
Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers, 146 INT’L LABOR REV. 21, 22–24 (2007)
(discussing Nike’s efforts to enforce minimum labor standards in the wake of public pressure).
67. See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of
Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 7–9 (2003).
68. See id. at 9.
69. See, e.g., James E. Snyder & Reva S. Bauch, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the
Workplace, CHI. BAR ASS’N REC., Nov. 2006, at 44, 45.
70. Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 302–03 (2007).
71. Archon Fung, Dara O’Rourke & Charles Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards: How
Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide,
BOSTON REV., Feb.–Mar. 2001, at 4 [hereinafter Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards]; see
also Archon Fung, Deliberative Democracy and International Labor Standards, 16
GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 51, 60 (2003) [hereinafter Fung,
Deliberative Democracy].
72. See Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards, supra note 71, at 4 (“RLS encourages the
incremental realization of demanding labor standards over time without imposing a uniform,
and potentially protectionist, standard upon diverse contexts.”).
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Regulation becomes more challenging when there are multiple
sets of guiding norms with plausible claims to legitimacy. As health
care rationing, working condition ordinances, and Internet filtering
demonstrate, regulators should utilize an approach that allows
different sets of tradeoffs and that achieves legitimacy through a
rigorous, inclusive process. The next Part describes the application of
this approach to Internet filtering by elucidating the four parts of this
Article’s new, process-based evaluative method.
II. A METHOD IN FOUR PARTS
To evaluate a country’s Internet filtering practices, the
Framework assesses openness, transparency, narrowness, and
accountability. These principles draw together common elements
from scholarly analysis of Internet filtering and proposals to regulate
it. These principles have not previously been used to create an
integrated methodology, however. The goal of the Framework is to
evaluate how well a country describes what it censors and why,
whether it effectively blocks proscribed material while leaving
permitted content untouched, and how much its citizens can
participate in filtering decisions.
A. Openness
The Framework’s first criterion is openness: does the country
admit to filtering the Internet and describe clearly its rationale for
blocking? Whereas censorship that is clearly disclosed and carefully
explained is more likely to be legitimate, censorship that is covert, or
that rests on flimsy pretexts, is less acceptable.
Compare Saudi Arabia and China, for example. Saudi Arabia
prevents users from accessing most pornographic and erotic material,
along with some pages on certain sects of Islam, other minority faiths,
73
alcohol, and illegal drugs. The Kingdom is open about censorship: its
Communications and Information Technology Commission explains
74
the filtering on its Web site. Saudi Arabia justifies these practices by
citing supporting materials that discuss social harms from
pornography, such as the Koran, an article on Internet pornography

73. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN SAUDI ARABIA 3–5 (2009),
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_SaudiArabia_2009.pdf.
74. See Internet.gov.sa, Content Filtering in Saudi Arabia, http://www.internet.gov.sa/
learn-the-web/guides/content-filtering-in-saudi-arabia (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
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written by Cass Sunstein, and the 1986 U.S. Attorney General’s
75
Commission on Pornography. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s Council of
Ministers promulgated a 2001 resolution describing prohibited
Internet content, including material “breaching public decency,”
“infringing the sanctity of Islam,” and running “contrary to the state
76
or its system.” Finally, users who attempt to reach a filtered site
receive a “block page” to inform them that the disruption is
77
deliberate.
Saudi Arabia discloses its online censorship and elucidates its
underlying rationales. China, by contrast, operates the world’s most
extensive and sophisticated Internet censorship system, yet rarely
78
admits that the country filters information. The Chinese filtering
79
apparatus is multilayered. Users are not informed when they are
prevented from reaching proscribed material; instead, their Internet
connections are reset, or their e-mail messages never reach their
80
destinations. Intentional censorship is difficult to distinguish from
technical errors. Queries for sensitive terms, such as “free tibet,” on
Chinese search engines generate results that deliberately purge
81
blocked sites. (Some search engines voluntarily notify users that
75. Internet Servs. Unit, King Abdulaziz City for Sci. & Tech., Introduction to Content
Filtering, http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2009).
76. Arab Media: Saudi Internet Rules, Council of Ministers Resolution (Feb. 12, 2001),
http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm.
77. See Internet.gov.sa, New Block Page, http://www.internet.gov.sa/news/new-block-page/
view?set_language=en (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (describing and linking to the block page that
a user will receive when trying to reach a filtered site). See generally Alfred Hermida, Saudis
Block 2,000 Websites, BBC NEWS, July 31, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2153312.
stm (discussing Saudi Arabia’s Internet filtering practice).
78. See, e.g., Access to Information and Media Control in the People’s Republic of China:
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, 110th Cong. 77 (2006)
(statement of Dr. Ronald J. Deibert, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of
Citizen Lab, University of Toronto), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/
transcripts/08_06_18trans/08_06_18_trans.pdf (“Official acknowledgement of these practices has
been inconsistent at best, deceitful at worst.”); Declan McCullagh, China: We Don’t Censor the
Internet. Really, CNET NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/China-We-dont-censor-theInternet.-Really/2100-1028_3-6130970.html (“In China, we don't have software blocking
Internet sites. . . . We do not have restrictions at all.” (quoting a Chinese government official)).
See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13 (describing China’s Internet filtering system);
Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Chinese Internet Censorship: An Inside Look, NETWORK WORLD, May
12, 2008, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/051208-china-internet.html (same).
79. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 9.
80. Id. at 17, 22.
81. OpenNet Initiative, Probing Chinese Search Engine Filtering (Aug. 19, 2004), http://
opennet.net/bulletins/005/.
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82

results are censored. ) Even users who are generally aware that
China prevents access to some material may be frustrated in
attempting to determine what content is blocked, and why. China’s
lack of openness is pernicious. Many Internet users do not know they
are operating in an information environment deliberately skewed by
the government; formally, they have no reason to be wary because
China does not usually admit to filtering.
Yet openness is easy to achieve. Nearly all filtering technology
can display a block page when a user is prevented from accessing
83
banned material. The page, which can be customized, informs the
user that their inability to reach a Web site is a deliberate policy
84
choice rather than a technical error. It is easy and inexpensive to be
open about filtering. Countries that nonetheless obfuscate their
censorship—such as Uzbekistan, which redirects users from banned
85
sites to innocuous ones—seek to conceal this filtering from citizens.
Governments generally advance two reasons for censoring the
Net. The first reason offered for filtering is that banned content
harms the community, regardless of any individual benefit. Singapore
bans “material that is objectionable on the grounds of public interest,
public morality, public order, public security, [and] national
86
harmony.” The second reason offered for filtering is that filtered
material harms the individual, who may not realize the danger of the
material or who may find it attractive nonetheless. Vietnam claims its
censorship “policy is to apply measures to prevent youngsters from
87
unhealthy sites.” Neither of these rationales is strengthened by
undisclosed restrictions—rather, notice that a country blocks access
reinforces the material’s harmfulness and the societal judgment that it

82. Nart Villeneuve, Perspectives on Transparency (June 26, 2008), http://www.nartv.org/
2008/06/26/perspectives-on-transparency/.
83. See, e.g., CISCO SYSTEMS, CISCO SECURITY APPLIANCE COMMAND LINE
CONFIGURATION GUIDE, VERSION 7.2–CONFIGURING HTTP FILTERING (2008), http://www.
cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa72/configuration/guide/filter.html#wp1042538 (explaining
how to configure HTTP filtering so that users are redirected to a block page when trying to
reach a blocked site).
84. See, e.g., Internet.gov.sa, supra note 77.
85. Robert Faris & Nart Villeneuve, Measuring Global Internet Filtering, in ACCESS
DENIED, supra note 9, at 5, 13.
86. Internet Code of Practice § 4(1) (1997) (Singapore), available at http://www.mda.gov.
sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.981.internet_code_of_practice.pdf.
87. Politics a No-No but Porn OK, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 15, 2006, at 33 (quoting Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Dung).
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deserves to be proscribed. In short, countries confident that
censorship advances their citizens’ welfare have no reason to hide
their actions. Countries that disclose restrictions are more likely to
have legitimate controls rather than ones designed to protect those
governing, but not the governed.
The openness criterion probes whether a state admits that it
censors the Internet and why.
B. Transparency
The Framework’s second prong is transparency: is the country
clear about what material it filters, and is the country specific about
the criteria it uses to determine which material to block? Transparent
categories and criteria allow users to assess how the list of banned
content maps onto the government’s rationales for information
control. A country that filters the Internet to prevent harm to minors,
for example, could plausibly censor Web sites offering medication
89
90
without a prescription, violent games, or encouragement for
91
anorexia. A system targeting sexually explicit material could
potentially block sites ranging from pornography to lingerie catalogs
92
to sex education. Thailand censors pornography; Iran blocks

88. See Schultz, supra note 33, at 823–28 (describing judging as catharsis). There may be a
“forbidden fruit” appeal to banned material, but it seems more likely to attract users to specific
contraband content, rather than general categories of sites.
89. Cf. Erik Eckholm, Abuses Are Found in Online Sales of Medication, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2008, at A21 (discussing possible solutions to the problem that “anyone of any age can obtain
dangerous and addictive prescription drugs with the click of a mouse,” including requiring
certification for online pharmacies).
90. Cf. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions on the Protection of Consumers, in Particular Minors, in Respect
of the Use of Video Games, at 8 COM (2008) 207 final (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0207:FIN:EN:PDF (recommending a
“swift and effective mechanism for age verification” to protect minors from harmful online
video games).
91. See, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, French Legislators Approve Law Against Web Sites
Encouraging Anorexia and Bulimia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/15/world/europe/15iht-paris.4.12015888.html; cf. Thomas Catan, Online Anorexia Sites
Shut Down Amid Claims They Glorify Starvation, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2007, http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article2916356.ece (discussing Spain’s decision to
shut down four pro-anorexia websites after receiving a complaint that they were endangering
the lives of teenage girls).
92. OPENNET INITIATIVE, THAILAND 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/
thailand.pdf.
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provocative attire sites as well; Saudi Arabia adds family planning
94
sites. Rationales are general. Transparency presses a state to go
beyond the reasons for filtering and explain precisely which content
runs counter to its goals.
Disclosure also pushes a government to go on record about the
types of content it purports to block; testing (covered in the next
Section, under narrowness) reveals the accuracy of those statements.
Transparency extends the openness analysis. A country could be open
without being transparent. For example, Tunisia blocks information
95
“likely to upset public order” and “contrary to public order and
96
97
good morals” but disguises what it actually censors. When users try
to reach a filtered site, they get an error message stating the site is
unavailable, rather than one indicating it is blocked. It is also possible
to have transparency without openness: China hedges about whether
it filters, but some domestic search engines disclose when they censor
98
query results. Yahoo!’s Chinese search engine is a contrast in
99
transparency: it lists sites censored for copyright violations, but does
100
not list those blocked for political reasons. Openness assesses
whether a state discloses why it censors. Transparency evaluates
whether it describes what it censors.
States can disclose what material they block either formally, such
101
as through codification in press regulations, or informally, such as in

93. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN IRAN 9 (2009), http://opennet.net/sites/
opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf.
94. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 73, at 5.
95. OPENNET INITIATIVE, TUNISIA 3 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/
tunisia.pdf (quoting Art. 9, DECREE OF THE MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF MARCH
22, 1997, and Art. 9, CODE DE LA PRESSE (translated by Harvard Law School Langdell
Library)).
96. Id. (citing Art. 49, DECREE OF THE MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF MARCH
22, 1997 (translated by Harvard Law School Langdell Library)).
97. Tunisia displays a “404 Not Found” error page (stating that the site does not exist or
cannot be found) rather than a “403 Forbidden” page (stating that the user may not reach the
requested site). Id.; Nart Villeneuve, Tunisia: Internet Filtering (June 7, 2005), http://www.
nartv.org/2005/06/07/tunisia-internet-filtering/.
98. Villeneuve, supra note 82 (suggesting that Western search engines such as Google have
established a norm of transparency).
99. See http://search.help.cn.yahoo.com/h3_9.html.
100. Nart Villeneuve, Search Monitor Project: Toward a Measure of Transparency 7 (Citizen
Lab, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2008), http://www.citizenlab.org/papers/searchmonitor.pdf.
101. Iran’s Press Law of 2000, for example, prohibits insulting Islam, attacking the Leader of
the Iranian Revolution, or quoting articles from groups opposing Islam. OPENNET INITIATIVE,
supra note 93, at 4–5.
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102

statements by government officials. Formal criteria are more
transparent; citizens have greater access to documented rules than to
oral utterances. Clarity in blocking disclosure varies greatly. France
103
requires filtering of hate speech, which is well-defined under its civil
and criminal laws as targeting a person or group based on their origin,
104
ethnic group, nationality, race, or religion. China, by contrast, is
vague about the material it filters, typically describing it as
105
106
“unhealthy,”
“spread[ing] rumours,”
“destroy[ing] national
107
108
unity,” or even just not “wholesome.” Moreover, China’s formal
regulation of Internet content comprises a morass of statutes,
109
regulations, and decrees from numerous government entities. This
complicates determining what content is subject to censorship.
China’s opacity is deliberate: it presses online service providers such
as Google and Sina to censor widely, given that the consequences of
erroneously allowing access to prohibited material can include loss of
110
an operating license or even criminal sanctions. It is more difficult
to assess what types of content are subject to blocking in China than
in France; therefore, France’s censorship is more transparent overall
than China’s censorship.
In addition to disclosing what content is filtered, states vary in
how clearly they describe criteria for determining whether material is
proscribed. More precise definitions enhance transparency. For
102. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
103. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 15; see also, e.g., Tribunal de Grande Instance
[T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ordonnance de référé
(Order for Summary Judgment), No. RG 00/05308, at 3, available at http://www.juriscom.net/
txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf (requiring Yahoo!’s French subsidiary to disable access to
auctions of Nazi memorabilia).
104. Arts. 23–24, Law on Press Freedom, J.O., July 29, 1881, at 4202, available at http://
www.lexinter.net/lois/provocation_aux_crimes_et_delits.htm (translation by author).
105. Ben Blanchard, China Won’t Guarantee Web Freedom over Olympics, REUTERS, May
8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Olympics/idUSPEK14583520080508 (quoting
Technology Minister Wan Gang).
106. Mark O’Neill, Beijing Closes Net Around Web Sites, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 4,
2000, at 10.
107. Id.
108. Marsan, supra note 78.
109. Melinda Liu & Quindlen Krovatin, Big Brother Is Talking, NEWSWEEK (PACIFIC ED.),
Oct. 17, 2005, at 20 (estimating thirty-eight different regulations); Cong.-Executive Comm’n on
China, Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/
exp/expcensors.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing nine governmental agencies).
110. See, e.g., Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem),
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 23, 2006, at 64 (describing Chinese pressure to censor and Google’s
acquiescence).
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111

example, blocking “child pornography,” when that material is
112
defined carefully in a state’s criminal code, is more transparent than
113
banning “nudity” when that content includes pornographic images,
pictures of Michelangelo’s statue of David, and photos of prisoner
114
abuse at Abu Ghraib. The clearer the criteria, the less discretion
government officials or ISPs have to define other sites as proscribed.
Uzbekistan’s Law on Principles and Guarantees on Access to
Information permits restricting information “in the name of
maintaining safety and protecting the moral values of society”—a
vague guideline that offers cover for censoring political opposition
115
sites and coverage critical of the authoritarian government.
Generality in defining what material is subject to filtering confers
considerable power on censors, whose ad hoc judgments are more
difficult to challenge when criteria are broad and can act as a pretext
for covert censorship.
Transparency checks how clearly a state describes the material
that it seeks to block. It enables comparison between stated motives
and the content a state targets based on these motives. Transparent
censorship specifies both the categories of banned content and rules
for determining whether material falls within them. Together,
transparency and openness reveal a sovereign’s public claims about
its information control.
C. Narrowness
The third criterion of the Framework is narrowness: how closely
does empirical data about what a country actually blocks match the
government’s description of its censorship? This Framework prong

111. E.g., Cybertip.ca, supra note 48 (describing a system deployed in Canada to “prevent
access to . . . child pornography images”).
112. CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(1) (1985) (Can.) (defining “child
pornography”).
113. See McAfee, 4.x Database: Secure Computing, http://www.securecomputing.com/index.
cfm?skey=86#categories (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (defining nudity as “non-pornographic
images of the bare human body”).
114. See, e.g., Xeni Jardin, BoingBoing Banned in UAE, Qatar, Elsewhere, BOING BOING,
Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.boingboing.net/2006/02/27/boingboing-banned-in.html (describing the
blocking of the blog Boing Boing because the filtering software SmartFilter classified it as
“nudity” even though less than 1 percent of posts contain nudity).
115. Inera Safargalieva, Uzbek Media and the Authorities—A Strange Relationship, in Fifth
Central Asian Media Conference, Sep. 17–18, 2003, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the
Media, Central Asia—In Defence of the Future 259, 263, available at http://www.osce.org/
publications/rfm/2004/02/12243_101_en.pdf.
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validates the claims a state makes (if any) about its filtering through
empirical testing by third parties. The openness and transparency
criteria assess what a country says about its censorship; the
narrowness criterion examines what it does.
Narrowness
considers
both
overinclusiveness
and
underinclusiveness. Most, if not all, Internet filtering systems will be
overbroad (blocking innocent content), underbroad (failing to block
proscribed material), or both. Both overinclusion and underinclusion
are problematic. Overbroad filtering keeps citizens from accessing
legitimate material. Underbroad blocking means a country fails to
censor content it views as dangerous.
Overinclusive censorship can be deliberate or inadvertent.
Vietnam claims to only filter Web sites that are harmful to minors, yet
its system concentrates on ensuring that political opposition sites
116
remain inaccessible.
This is a deliberate strategy to protect
117
Vietnam’s single-party Communist system. Overbreadth may also
represent a considered policy choice to tolerate false positive results
to minimize false negative ones. Inadvertent filtering can result from
classification errors, such as when Secure Computing’s SmartFilter
118
software categorized a Kentucky newspaper as pornography, or
from crude censorship techniques, such as when ISPs prevented
access to over a million unrelated Web sites to filter 400 with child
119
pornography, at Pennsylvania’s behest.
Underinclusive censorship occurs when users can routinely reach
banned content. (This differs from accessing blocked content via
120
circumvention techniques that deliberately evade filtering. )
116. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
117. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR,
VIETNAM: 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100543.htm (describing Vietnam’s efforts to restrict
publication of alternative political viewpoints and its Internet censorship practices).
118. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN
2004–2005: A COUNTRY STUDY 13 n.50 (2005), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_
UAE_Country_Study.pdf.
119. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 633–34, 650–52, 655 (E.D.
Pa. 2004).
120. See generally Nart Villeneuve, Technical Ways to Get Round Censorship, in
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS
(2005), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_bloggers_cyberdissidents-GB.pdf
(providing a list of filter-circumvention techniques and their associated advantages and
disadvantages); Hiawatha Bray, Beating Censorship on the Internet, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20,
2006, at A10 (discussing the use of networks of proxies to obfuscate web-surfers’ computer
identities).
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Singapore operates an underinclusive filtering system by design;
though all pornography is eligible for blocking, only a few sites are
121
symbolically targeted.
Countries can have both overbroad and underbroad censorship.
Vietnam’s filtering demonstrates both flaws: it fails to block any
pornographic sites, which are formally banned, but heavily censors
122
political sites. Australia blocks some—but by no means all—
123
pornographic sites, yet also censors a dentist and a canine kennel.
Commentary on filtering tends to ignore the problem of
underinclusion. Underbroad censorship, however, causes concern for
three reasons. First, assuming that a country adequately justifies
blocking access to harmful content, allowing users to view it is
undesirable. In 2006, British Telecom detected 35,000 daily attempts
124
to access child pornography. Until the end of 2007, however, it was
125
the only British ISP to block such attempts. If child pornography
should be censored, then allowing users to see it because of different
126
ISP practices is normatively problematic.
Second, censorship that targets some, but not all, content that is
nominally proscribed may enable selective enforcement. Egypt has
used a court decision that sanctioned the blocking of sites threatening
national security to prevent online access to Muslim Brotherhood, the
127
country’s major political opposition movement.
Censorship

121. OPENNET INITIATIVE, SINGAPORE 1 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/
singapore.pdf.
122. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 116, at 4; see also supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
123. David Kravets, WikiLeaks Exposes Australian Blacklist, WIRED, Mar. 19, 2009,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/wikileaks-expos/. The list is available at http://www.
wikileaks.org/wiki/Australian_government_secret_ACMA_internet_censorship_blacklist%2C_
18_Mar_2009.
124. Tim Richardson, Cleanfeed Working Overtime, Says BT, REGISTER, Feb. 7, 2006,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/02/07/bt_cleanfeed_iwf/.
125. Britain’s other ISPs “voluntarily” adopted Cleanfeed by the end of 2007, as demanded
by UK Home Office Minister Vernon Croaker. Frank Fisher, Caught in the Web, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/17/caughtintheweb.
126. But see Richard Clayton, Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System, in PRIVACY
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: 5TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP PET 2005, at 78, 82–89
(George Danezis & David Martin eds., 2006) (describing technical problems with Cleanfeed and
demonstrating how it can be used to create an index of child pornography sites).
127. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY PROFILES: EGYPT (2005), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2005/mena1105/4.htm; see also Sarah El Sirgany, Al-Ahram Reverses Internet Block on
Blogs, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.
aspx?ArticleID=2615.
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becomes a weapon in a government’s arsenal, deployed arbitrarily
rather than enforced consistently.
Finally, filtering that fails to block forbidden material—
especially badly flawed or nominal blocking—undercuts the
justification for restricting access. The rationale for censorship is that
some content is sufficiently harmful to warrant suppression; if much
of it remains available, the country’s efforts are likely pretextual.
Therefore, assessing whether a state’s censorship is underbroad,
overbroad, or both, requires careful empirical testing. This is
challenging; the number of Web sites is effectively infinite, and testing
even a representative sample is nearly impossible. Watchdog
organizations such as the OpenNet Initiative, Human Rights Watch,
and Reporters Without Borders employ two approaches. First, they
test an index of popular Web sites in a representative set of categories
(such as news sources, human rights, and pornography) that may be
128
blocked. Second, they check sites on topics sensitive to a given
129
country, such as pages about the Falun Gong movement in China.
For countries employing commercial filtering software, they can
check sites with known categories to establish which ones that nation
130
wants to block.
In future research, particularly under the Framework’s aegis,
testing that assesses narrowness should include a range of sites in
zones of content a state has vowed to restrict, in areas it is suspected
of covertly filtering (if any), and in categories that other states block.
The first list checks the effectiveness of a country’s blocking. The
second and third evaluate whether the government is forthright about
material it restricts.
Testing results show what types of sites a country filters (though
not a comprehensive list of blocked sites). This empirical data also
demonstrates underbreadth and overbreadth, along with how broad

128. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN VIETNAM IN 2005–2006: A
COUNTRY STUDY app. 2 (2006), http://opennet.net/studies/vietnam (displaying which sites on
ONI’s “[G]lobal List” were blocked in Vietnam); see also id. § 3.A (describing testing
methodology).
129. See, e.g., Paul Wiseman, In China, a Battle over Web Censorship, USA TODAY, Apr. 23,
2008, at 1A (describing searches for specific banned keywords on the Internet in China);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHINA: WORLD REPORT 2007 (2007), http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/
docs/2007/01/11/china14867.htm (describing China’s official reaction to Falun Gong); see also
REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, INTERNET ENEMIES 19–20 (2009), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/
Internet_enemies_2009_2_-3.pdf (providing a list of specific sites censored within Syria).
130. See infra note 319.
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(measured by the number of categories filtered) and deep (measured
by the percentage of sites per category) overblocking and
131
underblocking is. This enables comparison of a country’s actions to
its rhetoric.
One normative challenge with the narrowness evaluation is
deciding whether a site—blocked or unblocked—falls within the
parameters of what a country claims to filter. The more vague or
unclear the criteria, the more likely a site will fall within prohibited
content, or at least its penumbra. This uncertainty may be useful: it
can reveal innocent content that is swept up for blocking. Some
material is inherently susceptible to multiple classifications: gay or
lesbian dating sites may be blocked because a country objects to
132
133
134
dating services, discussion of gay and lesbian issues, or both.
Categorizing content involves subjective decisions; censors may be
lax, strict, or simply wrong. Some overblocking and underblocking is
likely even in a carefully defined, narrowly implemented filtering
regime. Assessing legitimacy, in terms of narrowness, is likely to
reveal a spectrum of practices rather than binary distinctions.
The three factors discussed thus far interoperate. Openness
assesses how straightforward a country is in revealing its reasons for
censorship. Transparency maps the content the country purports to
restrict. And narrowness checks how successful the country’s filtering
program is and whether it suppresses different matter than it claims.
D. Accountability
The Framework’s fourth criterion is accountability: to what
degree can citizens influence policymaking regarding what content is
censored? What measures or structures push officials to respond to
constituents? What recourse is available to content owners who
contend that they have been blocked erroneously?
The accountability criterion assesses how closely a country’s
censorship aligns with its citizens’ views. It also considers how
responsive blocking practices are to changes in those views.
Accountability has four major aspects: participation in censorship

131. See Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 11, 18–20 (describing a method for testing
Internet filtering and then listing results of those tests).
132. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 45, at 6.
133. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN YEMEN 4 (2009), http://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Yemen_2009.pdf.
134. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 93.
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decisions, specification of authority, opportunity to challenge, and
countermajoritarian constraints.
1. Participation. The accountability criterion’s participation
prong looks both at whether citizens influence the state’s decision to
block access to Internet material at all and at whether citizens
influence the state’s subsequent selection of sites to filter. The most
accountable method of developing a state filtering program involves a
democratic government’s adoption of a filtering policy after public
135
136
debate. Though it has faced significant criticism, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) enacted by the United States in
137
1998 is a good example of an accountable filtering program: it
138
enjoyed public hearings and was widely supported in Congress.
Under the DMCA, online service providers must filter access to
139
allegedly copyright-infringing materials —either on their servers or
140
in search results—to obtain safe harbor from secondary liability.
Filtering emerged from an established, participatory public regulation
process.
Citizens can participate in shaping a state’s filtering policy
indirectly, by electing a government that implements online
restrictions, and directly, by suggesting or “tagging” sites for addition
to a block list. France’s Interior Minister announced that French ISPs
had agreed, after negotiations with the government, to filter sites
141
containing child pornography, terrorism, or hate speech. French
users can submit suspect sites, and the government then decides

135. Michael Best and Keegan Wade propose a quantitative measure of how democratic a
country’s Internet regulation is. Michael L. Best & Keegan W. Wade, Democratic and AntiDemocratic Regulators of the Internet: A Framework, 23 INFO. SOC’Y 405, 410 (2007).
136. See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 739–40 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519, 534–37 (1999). But see Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the
Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67 (2006).
137. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
138. The DMCA passed unanimously. Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 635.
139. See, e.g., Chris Sherman, Google Makes Scientology Infringement Demand Public,
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Apr. 15, 2002, http://searchenginewatch.com/2159691; Google Asked
to Delist Scientology Critics (#1), CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, Mar. 8, 2002, http://
www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=232.
140. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)–(d) (2006).
141. France Blocks Online Child Porn, Terrorism, Racism, USA TODAY, June 10, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/world/2008-06-10-france-online-porn_N.htm.
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whether to include them on the list blocked by ISPs. Thus, French
citizens guide general censorship as well as specific filtering decisions.
Democratic government does not, however, guarantee
participation. Thailand generally functions as a democracy (albeit
143
with intermittent military coups ), but it operates a censorship
144
regime with minimal citizen participation. The Thai government
must theoretically obtain a court order to force ISPs to block a Web
site, but a government minister in May 2008 unilaterally ordered
filtering of a prominent independent news portal and a social criticism
145
site, both with popular discussion boards.
It is increasingly difficult to assess whether a country is
“democratic,” and using formal structures of government as a reliable
146
indicator of accountability is becoming problematic. For example, a
country may have the outward indicators of democratic governance,
yet subvert them via voter intimidation, arbitrary arrest, media
147
control, and state ownership of key information outlets. Russia,
148
149
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are examples of states in which the

142. U.S., France Move to Block Online Child Pornography, CBC NEWS, June 10, 2008,
http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/06/10/isps-porn-block.html.
143. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Ousted Premier Is Set to Return to Thailand, Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at A4 (discussing the return of the former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra after being ousted in a 2006 military coup).
144. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 92, at 3.
145. It is not clear whether the Thai government has legal authority to censor the Internet at
all. ACCESS DENIED, supra note 9, at 158–59; C.J. Hinke, Censoring Free Speech in Thailand,
GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY, May 17, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/05/17/
censoring-free-speech-in-thailand/.
146. See generally Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 36
(2002) (“[Transitions from authoritarian rule] have given birth to new forms of authoritarianism
that do not fit into our classic categories of one party, military, or personal dictatorship. They
have produced regimes that hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and interparty
competition, but at the same time violate minimal democratic norms so severely and
systematically that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, however qualified.”).
147. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Putin Aide Secures His Assured Victory in Russian Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at A3 (“Throughout the campaign, the Kremlin, having essentially
prevented any meaningful opposition, focused on getting enough people to the polls to allow
the vote to be depicted as legitimate.”); Russia Goes to the Polls, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov.
29, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/11/29/russia17440.htm (noting that Russian citizens
will be going to the polls “in a deteriorating human rights situation where fundamental
freedoms vital to free and fair elections are curtailed”).
148. See, e.g., Fabiola Sanchez, Venezuela’s Chavez Pushes Through 26 Decrees, USA
TODAY, Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-08-052755377644_x.htm (reporting that the new laws enacted by presidential decree aim to move
Venezuela toward a “centralized, state-run economic system”).
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appearance of democracy can be at odds with the reality of
governance, and in which accountability is diminishing.
Even U.S. efforts can generate accountability problems. In June
2008, New York’s Attorney General pressed three major ISPs to drop
a wide range of Usenet news groups—only eighty-eight of which had
150
illicit material—to reduce online distribution of child pornography.
151
By July 2008, AT&T and AOL agreed to do so as well. Beyond
narrowness concerns, the agreement with the Attorney General limits
Usenet access for all of the providers’ customers, not just those in
152
New York. Customers in other states, however, cannot hold a New
York official accountable. Other regulators, state or federal, might
have sought a different solution. For example, they might have
153
included other major ISPs (such as Comcast ), narrowed the
restrictions (perhaps to the eighty-eight groups with unlawful
images), or broadened the blocking to include Web sites with child
pornography (as initial reports indicated that New York had
154
required ). Other states have begun to echo New York’s demands of
155
ISPs,
increasing the likelihood of fragmented regulation and
diminished accountability.
Conversely, some citizen participation in developing filtering
policy is possible even in the absence of democratic government. For

149. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL OVER AGAIN: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND
FLAWED ELECTORAL CONDITIONS IN ZIMBABWE’S COMING GENERAL ELECTIONS (2008),
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe0308/ (noting that Zimbabwe’s “deeply flawed and rushed
electoral process,” and the government’s “continuing violations of civil and political rights”
make it unlikely that upcoming elections “will help Zimbabwe either establish democracy or
bring an end to the country’s ongoing political crisis”); Celia W. Dugger & Barry Bearak,
Mugabe Rival Quits Zimbabwe Runoff, Citing Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A1 (“It
remains to be seen whether southern Africa’s leaders will collectively censure [the incumbent
president] or take tougher steps, such as economic sanctions, to isolate his government. They
have never done so before, despite [previous] elections . . . that were widely believed to have
been marked by rigging and fraud, but that his regional peers declared legitimate.”).
150. McCullagh, supra note 3.
151. Linda Rosencrance, ISPs Join to Block Child Porn, PC WORLD, July 13, 2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/148295/isps_join_to_block_child_porn.html.
152. Hakim, supra note 3.
153. Comcast was the second-largest U.S. ISP for the third quarter of 2008. Alex Goldman,
Top 23 U.S. ISPs by Subscriber: Q3 2008, ISP-PLANET, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.isp-planet.com/
research/rankings/usa.html.
154. Peter Grier, ISPs Take Major Step in Curbing Child Porn, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 11, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0611/p01s09-usgn.html; see also
Hakim, supra note 3.
155. See, e.g., Marguerite Reardon, California Pols Ask ISPs to Block Child Porn, CNET
NEWS, June 20, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9973966-7.html.
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example, Saudi Arabia permits only limited political participation,
but it invites local users to suggest sites that should be blocked or to
challenge a decision to censor material. The Saudi censors receive
hundreds of requests each day to censor additional material (but only
157
a few to unblock sites). Such participation has had some effect,
though it has been limited in scope. In 2001, a Saudi official reported
that 30 percent of requests to block additional sites resulted in
additions to the Kingdom’s “black list,” and 3 percent of requests to
158
unblock material were granted. This example demonstrates that,
even if citizens have limited participation in a state’s governance, they
may be able to shape the state’s Internet censorship.
2. Delineated Authority. The accountability criterion also takes
into account whether citizens are able to hold government censors to
task. This assessment is eased considerably when the basis for
censorship is specified formally. The codification of censorship
criteria not only puts citizens on notice regarding prohibited content
but also constrains blocking decisions. When challenging a censor’s
decision is not possible, filtering that is at odds with a country’s rules
detracts from its legitimacy. And when citizens can contest
censorship, such contradictions weaken the basis for upholding it.
159
Italy passed legislation in 2005 allowing a government agency
to specify gambling sites that Italian ISPs must block (namely, sites
160
that did not register with the agency). The agency created and
161
published a list of the sites in February 2006. Thus, online gambling

156. See FREEDOM HOUSE, SAUDI ARABIA: 2007 (2007), http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7265 (“Saudi Arabia organized elections for
municipal councils in the first half of 2004, giving Saudi men a limited opportunity to select
some of their leaders at the local level.”).
157. Robin Miller, Meet Saudi Arabia’s Most Famous Computer Expert, LINUX.COM, Jan.
14, 2004, http://linux.com/archive/articles/33695.
158. ABDULAZIZ HAMAD AL-ZOMAN, THE INTERNET IN SAUDI ARABIA (TECHNICAL
VIEW) 26–28 (2001), available at http://www.isu.net.sa/library/CETEM2001-Zoman.pdf.
159. Disposizioni per la Formazione del Bilancio Annuale e Pluriennale dello Stato (Legge
Finanziaria 2006) [Orders Concerning the Formation of the Annual and Multi-Year State
Budgets (Budget Law 2006)], Dec. 29, 2005, Gazz. Uff. No. 302, available at http://www.camera.
it/parlam/leggi/05266l.htm.
160. Andrea Glorioso, Betting Websites Are Blocked in Italy, EUR. DIGITAL RIGHTS, June
21, 2006, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.12/italybetting.
161. Elenco di Cui al Decreto del Direttore Generale di AAMS 7 febbraio 2006 Relativo
alla Rimozione dei Casi di Offerta in Assenza di Autorizzazione, Attraverso Rete Telematica,
di Giochi “[List Pursuant to the Decree of the Director General of the AAMS (Autonomous
State Monopolies Administration on Technical Regulations) of 7 February 2006 on the
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enterprises knew whether they had been filtered, and why. Indeed,
Malta-based bookmaker Astrabet successfully challenged its ban in
162
court. Specifying the criteria for filtering and the individual sites to
be blocked limited the government’s discretion in banning online
content and enabled the affected sites to contest blacklisting.
Formalizing censorship standards, though, may not sufficiently
constrain officials—or provide grounds to argue that a ban
contravenes applicable law. Singapore, for example, carefully
specifies its filtering requirements via statute (the Media
163
164
Development Authority Act
and the Broadcasting Act ),
165
regulation (broadcasting class licenses ), and ISP industry policy
documents (the Media Development Authority’s Internet Code of
166
Practice ). Singapore, however, broadly defines prohibited content—
such as content that is “objectionable on the grounds of public
interest, public morality, public order, [or] public security.” These
167
elastic guidelines provide discretion to government censors.
Although the putative focus of Singapore’s filtering is pornography,
the government has employed these elastic guidelines to block
168
popular gay and lesbian sites. The ability to argue that the
government has exceeded its mandate is limited by the broad
regulatory language defining what constitutes banned content. Thus,
the case of Singapore demonstrates that even a country that specifies
Prohibition of Gaming or Betting Through the Internet Without Authorization]”,
AMMINISTRAZIONE AUTONOMA DEI MONOPOLI DI STATO, http://www.aams.it/site.php?page=
20060213093814964&
op=download.
162. Glorioso, supra note 160.
163. Media Development Authority Act, ch. 172 (2003) (Singapore), available at http://
agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-172&doctitle=MEDIA
%20DEVELOPMENT%20AUTHORITY%20OF%20SINGAPORE%20ACT%0A&date=lat
est&method=part.
164. Broadcasting Act, ch. 28 (2002) (Singapore), available at http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/
non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-28&doctitle=BROADCASTING%20ACT
%0A&date=latest&method=part.
165. Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification, Broadcasting Act, ch. 28, § 9 (1996)
(Singapore), available at http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicence.pdf.
166. Internet Code of Practice (1997) (Singapore).
167. Id. § 4(1).
168. See Singapore Bans Gay Website, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 28, 2005, available
at http://www.smh.com.au/news/breaking/singapore-bans-gay-website/2005/10/28/1130400335787
.html (reporting that the Media Development Authority banned a gay Web site “after receiving
complaints about the promotion of promiscuous homosexual behaviour and recruitment of
underage boys for sex and nude photography . . . . [and] [i]nvestigations showed the two sites
breached the Internet Code of Practice, which governs the content of websites in Singapore”).
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filtering criteria in formal regulations may not be accountable to
citizens. Overall, the more clearly authority for censorship is
demarcated, the more legitimate decisions on restricting information
will be.
3. Opportunity to Challenge. Censors make mistakes. In addition
to challenging erroneous classifications, content owners may want to
challenge decisions that correctly classify their Web sites by attacking
the rationale underlying the state’s censorship. One aspect of
accountability is whether a state provides citizens with the means to
contest censorship. This aspect of accountability interacts with a
state’s mode of governance—democratic institutions generally
provide for redress, whether via legislatures or courts. This aspect
also interacts with the level of specificity of the state’s filtering
program; the more concrete the guidelines are, the easier it is to show
whether a particular decision contravenes them. Allowing challenges
to state censorship enhances legitimacy because it forces a state to
justify its decisions, presses censors to align their decisions with the
stated criteria for censorship, and allows content creators to argue for
their material’s legality.
China, for example, fares poorly on this front. The country
implements its filtering policies via a congeries of statutes, agency
169
regulations, and informal measures.
Censorship mixes legal
170
restrictions and tacit cooperation by Internet companies. It is

169. See, e.g., State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, Provisions on the Administration
of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services, Dec. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.chinasarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/12/29/20071229134709730745.html; Ministry of Info.
Indus. & Gen. Admin. of Press and Publ’n, Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet
Publication, June 27, 2002, http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/displayModeTwo.asp?id=2393;
Ministry of Info. Indus., Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services,
CHINA TRADE SERVICES, Sept. 25, 2000, available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/
2000-09-25/18565.shtml; Internet Soc’y of China, Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and
Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry (July 19, 2002), http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/
ca102762.htm (noting that the public pledge was drafted in order “to establish a self-regulating
mechanism for China’s Internet Industry, improve the conduct of Internet Industry Participants
and promote and ensure the sound development of the Internet Industry consistent with the
law”). See generally Liu & Krovatin, supra note 109 (describing how local Chinese governments
have recruited “Internet moles” to “tout the party line online and by doing so, to nip unrest in
the bud”).
170. See generally Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China’s Censorship of the
Internet and the Strain on the Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 577, 590 (2007)
(“U.S.-based companies continue to capitulate on the new Chinese restrictions on speech.
Google agreed to exclude from a list of links publications that the Chinese government finds
objectionable. Microsoft sends an error message to Internet users in China who use its search
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difficult to determine how to contest censorship, and who to hold
responsible. Even citizens bold enough to challenge restrictions—
such as a dog owner who filed a lawsuit over the removal of his post
171
criticizing Beijing’s animal size limits —face legal hurdles (the court
rejected his case) and informal pressures such as harassment from
government agents. Chinese citizens—many of whom endorse a
172
governmental role in regulating Internet content —evidently view
formal challenges as futile; only two such lawsuits have ever been
173
filed.
It is not surprising that states with independent judicial systems
are the most likely to allow citizens to challenge filtering decisions.
Astrabet sued in Italian court to overturn government-mandated
174
blocking of its site, and won. In the United States, the Center for
Democracy & Technology successfully sued to overturn a
Pennsylvania law mandating blocking of Internet child pornography
175
that also caused filtering of over one million unrelated sites.
Although there is a strong connection between citizens’ ability to
challenge censorship meaningfully and the overall form of
governance in place in a country, it is possible for citizens to contest
filtering decisions even in nondemocratic countries. For example,
176
Saudi Arabia allows requests for sites to be unblocked. And efforts
by civic actors in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan have led those
177
governments to reverse filtering of political opposition sites.

engine for words such as democracy, freedom, human rights, or demonstration.”); Lokman Tsui,
Internet in China: Big Mama Is Watching You 27 (July 2001) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of
Leiden), available at http://www.lokman.nu/thesis/010717-thesis.pdf (“The basic principle
behind the concept of internet regulation in China is ‘one is responsible for what one publishes.’
As a result, internet-related companies in China practice a high degree of selfcensorship . . . [which] is necessary in order to gain the trust and cooperation of the
government.”).
171. Edward Cody, Dog Owner Takes on China’s Web Censors, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2007,
at A18.
172. Deborah Fallows, Few in China Complain About Internet Controls, PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT, Mar. 27, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/776/china-internet (reporting
that 80 percent of respondents support Internet regulation, and that 85 percent believe that the
government should undertake it).
173. Cody, supra note 171.
174. See Glorioso, supra note 160.
175. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610–11, 662 (E.D. Pa
2004).
176. See AL-ZOMAN, supra note 158, at 28.
177. Rafal Rohozinski & Vesselina Haralampieva, OpenNet Initiative, Commonwealth of
Independent States, http://opennet.net/research/regions/cis (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
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Although they are less robust than Italian or American methods for
challenging censorship, these examples show that there is a
continuum of means to contest filtering and that a country’s
governance is not a perfect proxy for this variable. Enabling citizens
to contest censorship decisions is a key component of legitimacy.
4. Countermajoritarian Constraints. A final factor in measuring
accountability is the existence of countermajoritarian constraints.
Even under a democratic government, a state may discriminate
against minority groups, whose limited numbers impede their ability
to counteract majoritarian rule. Discrimination, unfortunately, may
be popular.
Censorship of minority-interest Internet content is common. For
example, Vietnam blocks pages about the Montagnards, who are both
a political minority (having aided the U.S. during the Vietnam War)
178
and a religious one (being predominantly Christian). Oman blocks
179
gay and lesbian sites. Pakistan blocks sites advocating independence
180
for its Balochistan and Sindh provinces.
When a minority of citizens wants access to certain material and
the majority wants to prevent it, filtering poses a difficult normative
problem. When should the minority’s objections be upheld?
Ultimately, this is a question of system design—that is, of determining
what structures (if any) limit popular sovereignty. Here, censorship is
one example of a larger puzzle in governance and legal philosophy.
American legal scholars have long struggled to describe the proper
constraints on majoritarian decisionmaking and to defend the
rationale for imposing such limits in a representative democracy.
Alexander Bickel described the “Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty,”
noting that having an independent judiciary review (and, potentially,
disallow) democratic decisions could cause legislatures to overly rely
181
on courts to save them from illegitimate or unlawful actions. Bickel
concluded, however, that judicial training and judges’ focus on a

178. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 116, at 4. See generally Vietnam: Montagnards Face
Religious, Political Persecution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 13, 2006, http://hrw.org/en/news/
2006/06/13/vietnam-montagnards-face-religious-political-persecution (documenting Vietnamese
mistreatment of Montagnard refugee and asylum seekers).
179. OPENNET INITIATIVE, OMAN 3 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_
Oman_2007.pdf.
180. OPENNET INITIATIVE, PAKISTAN 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/
pakistan.pdf.
181. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (1962).
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case’s specific facts usefully enable reconsideration of controversial
182
regulation.
Another perspective frames these limits as a second-order
problem: they should prevent a majority from altering systemic
structures to deprive minority voices of the ability to be heard and to
participate in governance. John Hart Ely saw courts, and
constitutional interpretation more broadly, as focused primarily upon
ensuring procedural protections, while deferring normative
183
judgments to government’s representative branches. Checks on
popular sovereignty create perils, though—particularly when
implemented through institutions with limited accountability. Thus,
political philosopher Jeremy Waldron attacks countermajoritarian
constraints as disenfranchising citizens and privileging the value
preferences of judges who are subject only to limited political
184
constraints. Whether, and to what degree, popular will should be
185
limited—to protect shared values or to prevent discrimination
186
against weaker minority groups —is highly contested, and beyond
the scope of this Article.
Internet censorship may, however, make countermajoritarian
constraints particularly important for two reasons. First, filtering is
not always transparent: it can be difficult to detect what content is
187
inaccessible or what sites are removed from search engine results.
(Contrast this with the ease of detecting censorship in physical media,
as when copies of National Geographic in China had pages on
188
disputed borders or ethnic minorities glued together. ) Filtering risks
altering not government’s systemic structures, but the information
citizens use to make decisions. Russian citizens may not know about
political opposition, or its grounds for complaint, if contrary views are

182. Id. at 131–32.
183. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–
77 (1980).
184. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1353 (2006).
185. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1079–80 (1980).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
187. See, e.g., Nart Villeneuve, Degrading Transparency: Comparing Google, Yahoo and
Microsoft (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.nartv.org/2008/01/25/degrading-transparency-comparinggoogle-yahoo-and-microsoft/.
188. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Glued Geographic, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/
chinajournal/2008/06/04/glued-geographic/.
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purged from mass media. Thus, censorship subtly raises Ely’s
concerns about skewing process.
Second, censorship prevents access to material that might
influence views regarding its necessity. It is easier to undercut
political opponents or critics when material supporting their views is
190
unavailable. Subjective preferences are not independent or static;
191
they evolve in response to available information. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes noted, today’s minority viewpoint may be tomorrow’s
192
accepted wisdom.
Accountability may, therefore, require limiting censorship’s
responsiveness to popular sentiment. This could include both
regulatory inertia—dampening or delaying shifts with changes in
social views—as well as countermajoritarian protections for minority
expression. Filtering must be responsive to citizens’ preferences, but
not too responsive. At a minimum, accountability analysis should
include assessing how a country addresses minority concerns and the
risks of majoritarian control.
Accountability, the Framework’s final factor, complements the
previous three by measuring how responsive censorship practices are
to the people they are supposed to protect. With the Framework’s
overview complete, the next question is how to translate the
Framework into concrete tools for assessing censorship.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The Framework is only as useful as its implementation. The best
way to apply it is for multiple entities, public and private, to construct
quantitative metrics that measure how a censorship program fares on
each criterion. As these metrics are used, they will inevitably
compete, refining and improving their measurements. The metrics
can, and should, guide corporate decisions, government regulation,
and third-party assessments regarding Internet censorship.

189. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, It Isn’t Magic: Putin Opponents Vanish From TV, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A1.
190. See id.
191. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008) (discussing
how the design of “choice environments” can lead to optimal decisions); Derek E. Bambauer,
Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas,
77 COLO. L. REV. 649 (2006) (arguing that perceptual biases in information accumulation and
processing undercut traditional decisionmaking models).
192. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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A. Developing the Metrics
The Framework’s purpose is to enable rigorous assessments of
the legitimacy of Internet censorship. Implicit in this goal is
comparison: evaluating whether China’s Internet is more legitimate
than Iran’s, or whether that blocking has become more legitimate
over time. Comparison based upon general principles is difficult. It is
challenging, for example, to establish why a particular state is
transparent without a means of measuring that quality. Metrics
provide that means.
When all countries are evaluated under the same rules, it is
possible to compare scores to determine relative position.
Establishing a metric system with numeric criteria would be useful to
rate a country on each of the Framework’s four factors. For example,
a metric could evaluate openness by awarding points for disclosure,
such as formal, written admissions of censorship; availability of
rationales for filtering in official documents or Web sites; use of a
block page when citizens attempt to access banned material;
willingness of government officials to discuss filtering, and so forth.
Freedom House uses an analogous metric system to assess the effects
of a country’s political environment on press freedom, asking (among
other questions) whether media regulatory bodies can operate freely
and independently (scored from 0 to 2 points); whether the
constitution or other basic laws protect freedoms of the press and
expression, and whether those provisions are enforced (0 to 6 points);
and whether there are penalties for libeling state officials, and the
193
degree of enforcement (0 to 3 points).
In analyzing narrowness, a metric could check how effectively a
country blocks material it seeks to censor (with 100 percent efficacy
the goal); how many categories of material other than those officially
targeted are blocked, and how heavily (using, for example, Open
194
Directory Project’s classification system, or the OpenNet Initiative’s
195
196
categories or global list ); and how precise the method used is (with
less credit awarded for crude methods such as IP address blocking).
Using metrics would consistently quantify filtering for the
Framework’s four axes. Metrics have also been helpfully employed
193. FREEDOM HOUSE, SURVEY METHODOLOGY 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop08/Methodology2008.pdf.
194. Open Directory Project Home Page, http://www.dmoz.org/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
195. See Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 7.
196. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 128.
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for analyzing other contested issues, including corruption, press
198
199
200
freedom, economic freedom, labor conditions, environmental
201
friendliness, and ICT (information and communication technology)
202
readiness.
Metrics serve at least four useful purposes. First, metrics
translate abstract standards into concrete evaluations. Second, they
can exert pressure upon laggards (at least, those who purport to
espouse the relevant standards) to improve compliance. Third, they
can help guide decisions—from where to locate a factory to whether
to list a country as a human rights violator. Finally, metrics direct
critical attention back to their standards. Implementation challenges
can highlight criteria that are insufficiently precise or too difficult to
203
measure accurately.
Designing a metric involves challenging, subjective choices in
measurement. What considerations should be included? How should
the components be weighed relative to one another? How should a
metric account for internal inconsistencies, such as when ISPs filter to

197. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT’L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2006, at 3–5 (2006), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/9757/71853/version/1/file/BPI_2006_Analysis_R
eport_270906_FINAL.pdf; Transparency Int’l, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
198. See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 193, at 4.
199. See, e.g., JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2007
ANNUAL REPORT 3–4 (2007), available at http://www.freetheworld.com/2007/EFW2007
BOOK2.pdf; Heritage Found. & Wall St. J., 2009 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.
heritage.org/index/Download.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
200. See, e.g., Richard M. Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring Improve
Labor Standards?: Lessons from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LABOR RELATIONS REV. 3, 4 (2007); Nike,
Audit Tools, http://www.nikebiz.com/nikeresponsibility/#workers-factories/audit_tools (last
visited Oct. 23, 2009) (providing the tools and measures that Nike uses to determine factory
compliance with its labor standards).
201. See, e.g., ADVANCE, SUSTAINABLE VALUE OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRY: A VALUEBASED ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING
COMPANIES 6 (2006), available at http://www.advance-project.org/downloads/advancesurveyfull
version.pdf; Global Reporting Initiative, Reporting Framework Overview, http://www.global
reporting.org/ReportingFramework/ReportingFrameworkOverview/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
202. See, e.g., BRIDGES.ORG, E-READINESS ASSESSMENT TOOLS COMPARISON 1–3 (2005),
available at http://www.bridges.org/files/active/0/ereadiness_tools_bridges_10Mar05.pdf;
INFODEV, E-READY FOR WHAT? E-READINESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CURRENT
STATUS AND PROSPECTS TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 5 (2005),
available at http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.3.html.
203. See, e.g., Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 425, 425–36 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds.,
2000).
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varying degrees, or when government officials waver on admitting
205
to censorship? The next normative choice involves comparing and
weighing the different factors of the Framework. Should openness
count more than narrowness? Finally, the metric must select the level
at which countries can be compared. Can scores for each component
be aggregated into a composite? Is it too difficult to comprehend
factor-by-factor comparisons? Transparency International, for
example, creates an overall measure of how corrupt a country is
206
perceived to be. These are all hard decisions, and there are no
obviously correct choices. As with filtering itself, there are likely
multiple defensible answers.
The best path is to generate multiple metrics, reflecting the range
207
of defensible answers to these value-driven questions. Different
entities could create and apply metrics. It would be optimal to have a
mix of public actors (such as the U.S. Department of State or the
Internet Governance Forum) and private entities (such as the Center
for Democracy & Technology, Human Rights Watch, or the OpenNet
Initiative) create measurement tools. Analysts will measure
compliance with each factor differently—and will weigh the relative
importance of each factor variously. Each metric should make clear
both how it resolves these questions and why. This level of clarity
would not only illuminate how censoring countries fare when the
methodology for each factor changes, but it would also reveal the
208
values that each rating entity prioritizes.
This is an unusual proposal: achieving greater insight and
comparing countries more readily by using more than one metric to

204. Yemen’s two ISPs, for example, filter varying levels of content. OPENNET INITIATIVE,
supra note 133, at 4.
205. Compare McCullagh, supra note 78 (noting Chinese government officials’ denial of
Internet filtering in China), with Andrew Jacobs, China Angered by U.S. Lobbying on Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/sports/olympics/01dissidents.html
(documenting Chinese authorities’ decision to maintain a firewall on the Internet during the
Olympics).
206. JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2007, at 2–9 (2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/content/
download/23965/358196.
207. Cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION 1–12 (2002) (making a similar argument for competition in securities
regulation).
208. Cf. Balkin et al., supra note 42, at 9–10 (discussing how templates that rate Web
content reveal preferences).
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rate them. There are several key benefits to having multiple,
competing metrics. First, quantifying the Framework’s four principles
involves subjective judgments. Analysts will differ, reasonably, on
such choices. By making explicit their weighting, metrics can assess a
country under different tests that could generate a consensus view, or
expose key zones of disagreement. Second, competition presses
creators to refine measurements.
Demand from metrics users—nongovernmental organizations,
state actors, and companies—will elucidate the benefits and
shortcomings of each tool. As some metrics are used, and others are
ignored, the set of reputable tools for future use will decrease. In
addition, organizations that develop metrics can reassess their choices
and how they implement them by examining the choices of other
210
211
entities. The World Bank and Freedom House can address
political accountability in ways from which other entities can learn,
and OpenNet Initiative’s narrowness criteria will have refinements to
212
offer other entities. Metrics should get better and fewer over time
through competition.
Finally, adopting an open, competitive methodology for
measuring filtering is consistent with the Framework’s focus on
process rather than substance. Metrics will not reflect a single view of
how to measure factors, but will rely on interaction and competition
to arrive at workable models.
B. Alternatives
There are other paths to produce metrics—most notably, a
cooperative effort among stakeholders to produce a consensus tool,
or a top-down approach. The proposed competitive process, however,
appears more effective: cooperation has proven inadequate thus far,
and no one entity has sufficient power to force adoption of its criteria.

209. See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 89 (2007) (discussing challenges of multiple regulatory standards in securities listings).
210. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters
VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2007, at 7–11, 28, 37 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4654, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148386.
211. See FREEDOM HOUSE, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2007: SURVEY
METHODOLOGY passim (2007), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/page38.pdf.
212. See, e.g., Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 7–9, 18–22.
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1. Collaboration. A metric produced through collaboration
among affected parties and experts on Internet censorship is
intuitively appealing. Such a metric would be more likely to be
broadly accepted, and could eliminate the time necessary for
213
competing models to coalesce and adapt. It could draw upon
expertise to reflect best practices and avoid past errors. But
collaboration suffers from two key shortcomings, namely, selection
problems and risk of gridlock. Moreover, collaborative attempts at
establishing a code of conduct for Internet companies have dragged
on without producing readily measurable results. After years of
214
215
frustration and press releases, these attempts have generated
principles but no means to measure their implementation.
216
The Global Network Initiative (GNI), a consortium of activist
groups, civil society organizations, academics, investment funds, and
three technology companies (Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!), finally
released a set of principles intended to guide technology companies in
217
dealing with governmental pressures on human rights issues. The
Initiative sets forth principles similar to this Article’s Framework,
such as governance, accountability, and transparency, but it confronts
218
three critical limitations. First, only three companies have signed on
to GNI, and although they are significant market players, it is not
clear that they will induce other firms, such as Cisco or Skype, to join.
Similarly, watchdogs such as Amnesty International have pointedly

213. Cf. Fung, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 71, at 53–54 (describing a “grand
consensus” approach to labor standards).
214. See Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 9
(2008) (statement of Aryind Ganesan, Deputy General Counsel, Google, Inc.), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/20/usint18894.htm (describing an effort by technology
companies, human rights organizations, and scholars “to develop a voluntary code of conduct
and process of enforcement to try to curtail censorship and protect user information,” but
noting “almost 18 months later, it would be great to tell you that a code is finalized and a system
is in place to address these problems, but instead, we are still negotiating, and in the meantime,
internet users are no safer, and censorship continues”).
215. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 9.
216. Global Network Initiative, Participants, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/
participants/index.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
217. Global Network Initiative, Principles, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles
/index.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
218. Global Network Initiative, Governance, Accountability & Learning Framework, http://
www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
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declined to join the effort over concerns about its standards.
Second, reaching agreement on principles is straightforward, whereas
implementing them and measuring that implementation is
complicated. The Initiative sets up a methodology for
220
implementation, but its use in practice remains uncertain. Finally,
companies can avoid breaching the Initiative’s code by delegating
control to local partners; firms need only use “best efforts” to ensure
221
compliance with the principles. To date, the GNI is a cautionary tale
about collaborative efforts rather than a success story.
The GNI underscores the challenges of choosing participants in a
collaborative effort. Selection reflects subjective values about which
participants are and are not appropriate, relevant, and useful. For
example, a consensus approach would include companies whose
financial results might be affected by the metric they would help
222
develop, such as Microsoft and Google. Companies with the most
insight to contribute would be those with the greatest conflicts of
interest: filtering software companies such as Secure Computing and
Fortinet. Excluding these firms would detract from the effort to
include all stakeholders, but including them would harm the metric’s
credibility.
A consensus effort could easily splinter. Those not selected
might become disaffected, opting not to recognize the metric or even
developing a competing one. It might be possible to launch a truly
participatory, open source project to measure the Framework’s
criteria, but Internet censorship is controversial, and open source
projects often struggle to accommodate divergent views on contested
223
issues. Consensus dissolves readily, as demonstrated by “forks” in
224
open source projects.

219. Bobbie Johnson, Amnesty Criticises Global Network Initiative for Online Freedom of
Speech, GUARDIAN, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/30/amnestyglobal-network-initiative.
220. See Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines, http://www.globalnetwork
initiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
221. Id.
222. See discussion infra Part III.C. If China’s filtering were rated as illegitimate by the new
metric, and transactions by technology companies enabling China’s censorship attracted
heightened scrutiny, Microsoft and Google might be pressured to reduce such business, and
hence lose revenue.
223. Wikipedia, for example, has frequently limited edits to its entry on George W. Bush for
this reason. See Ulrik Brandes & Jürgen Lerner, Visual Analysis of Controversy in UserGenerated Encyclopedias, 7 INFO. VISUALIZATION 34, 36, 46 (2008); Stacy Schiff, Know It All:
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Even a collaborative effort that does not splinter may falter due
to gridlock. Members may be unable to resolve differences of
opinion. Some may delay due to strategic behavior—it may be
beneficial to appear to work on evaluating Internet censorship
without risking unfavorable analysis from the final product. The
broader the range of participants, the more likely disagreement is to
occur—technology companies, governments, and human rights
monitors have divergent goals and normative approaches. Debates
over the Global Network Initiative, which was styled as a
225
collaborative approach, exemplify this problem. Thus, collaboration
is unlikely to generate the necessary metrics.
2. Top-Down. A metric created through a top-down process
could be developed more rapidly than one built through collaboration
or competition and would enable standardized analysis. But a topdown process would require a sufficiently powerful stakeholder to
press for its adoption and use. For Internet filtering, there is no single
entity able to impose its preferences on other stakeholders. This may
be beneficial: any party sufficiently powerful to require use of its
metric would be strongly tempted to codify its normative preferences
on filtering into a mandatory standard. Measurements propagated by
the U.S. government would likely include, even if only implicitly,
American views about free expression. This would undermine the
Framework’s agnosticism on substantive issues.
Attempts to force a single metric would likely founder because
dissenters could, and would, produce their own criteria. Thus, the two
major alternatives for producing metrics—collaboration and a
mandatory standard—are likely to dissolve into competition. It is
preferable to begin with, and leverage, the inevitable jockeying
among standards.

Can Wikipedia Conquer Expertise?, NEW YORKER, July 31, 2006, at 36, 42, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/31/060731fa_fact.
224. See, e.g., Paul Adams, In Response to User Demand, Pidgin Forks, WEBMONKEY, Apr.
22, 2008, http://webmonkey.com/blog/In_Response_to_User_Demand__Pidgin_Forks
(announcing that Pidgin, an open source instant-messaging software, has “forked”); cf. Jill
Coffin, Analysis of Open Source Principles in Diverse Collaborative Communities, FIRST
MONDAY, June 5, 2006, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/
1342/1262 (analogizing the Burning Man community in the Black Rock Desert of Nevada to an
open source project and describing its eventual “fork”).
225. See supra notes 214–21 and accompanying text.
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Finally, using competing alternatives to evaluate censorship fits
226
well with the Internet’s ethos. Leaders or standards from TCP/IP to
227
Google emerged from a welter of competitors. Even the core
228
Internet protocols are framed as consensual standards, where usage
229
is voluntary and replacement is commonplace. The Internet itself
could be a valuable tool for creating, promulgating, and developing
230
metrics.
An open, competitive process for producing metrics to measure
filtering best enables development of useful tools to measure the
Framework’s prongs quantitatively.
C. Using the Metrics
Metrics that measure the legitimacy of filtering can contribute to
three contentious debates: corporate decisions on whether to sell
censorship-enabling technology to a country; government
deliberations on whether to regulate these choices through public law;
and normative evaluations of filtering by third parties.
1. Corporate Decisions. Western corporations have stirred
controversy by supplying technology that enables countries to filter
the Internet, and by censoring the services they offer to these
231
nations. California-based firm Fortinet sold firewall technology to
Burma that lets its military dictatorship limit citizens’ access to online

226. See Laura Chappell, Migrating to IP, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, Oct. 18, 1999,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/1999/1018feat.html (describing the “inevitable upgrade to
TCP/IP” from Novell’s IPX/SPX, the previously dominant network protocol).
227. See Jefferson Graham, The Search Engine That Could, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2003, at
1D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-08-25-google_x.htm.
228. See S. BRADNER, THE INTERNET STANDARDS PROCESS – REVISION 3 (1996),
ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/bcp/bcp9.txt (noting the Internet relies on “voluntary adherence
to open protocols and procedures”).
229. See, e.g., P. Mockapetris, Domain Names – Concepts and Facilities [RFC 1034] (Nov.
1987), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt?number=1034 (replacing RFC 973).
230. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing the emerging “phenomenon of large- and medium-scale
collaborations among individuals that are organized without markets or managerial hierarchies”
on the Internet); Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1987–96
(2006) (arguing that Internet reforms should be tailored to minimize their “impact on
generativity”).
231. See generally David Bandurski, Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet, 171 FAR E.
ECON. REV. 18 (2007) (describing how Internet censorship technology is enabling the Chinese
government to use the Beijing Association of Online Media as its agent to monitor and filter
Internet content).
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material about human rights, political dissent, and ethnic minority
232
groups. Cisco’s routers form a key component of China’s censorship
233
system. Internal documents reveal not only that Cisco knows that
China uses its products to censor the Internet but also that the
234
company views this practice as a business opportunity. Secure
Computing sells its Internet filtering software and content
235
236
classification database to Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Sudan;
237
Websense provides its version to Yemen. Google, Yahoo!, and
Microsoft operate search engines in China that remove results linking
238
to blocked sites. Google’s localized French, German, and Canadian
239
search engines similarly delist hate speech pages. Microsoft’s
Chinese MSN Spaces blog site prevents users from posting sensitive
240
keywords including “democracy” and “demonstration.”
Although they are profitable, these transactions generate
criticism. In May 2008, U.S. Senator Richard Durbin compared
Google’s justification for its Chinese search engine censorship to
241
arguments for doing business with South Africa under apartheid.
The U.S. Congress has held numerous hearings on corporate

232. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN BURMA IN 2005: A COUNTRY STUDY
4–5, 18, 24 (2005), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Burma_Country_Study.pdf; see
also Nart Villeneuve, Fortinet for Who? (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.nartv.org/2005/10/13/
fortinet-for-who/.
233. See ETHAN GUTMANN, LOSING THE NEW CHINA 130–32, 158–60 (2004).
234. CISCO SYS., OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY SECTOR 57–58 (2002) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (describing the Chinese government’s goal to “[c]ombat ‘Falun Gong’
evil religion and other hostiles” and concomitant Cisco business opportunities in technical
training, security, and operational maintenance); Glenn Kessler, Cisco File Raises Censorship
Concerns, WASH. POST, May 20, 2008, at D1.
235. Ben Arnoldy, When US-Made “Censorware” Ends Up in Iron Fists, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1010/p01s01-ussc.
html.
236. See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, SUDAN (2009), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.
net/files/ONI_Sudan_2009.pdf (describing Internet filtering technology and its usage in Sudan).
237. Xeni Jardin, Exporting Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A23.
238. Villeneuve, supra note 100.
239. See Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra note
214, at 9 (statement of Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google, Inc.), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3369; see also supra note 15.
240. Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogs, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/technology/4088702.stm.
241. Nate Anderson, Sen.: Iron Curtain Swapped for Virtual Curtain of Censorship, ARS
TECHNICA, May 20, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080520-sen-iron-curtainswapped-for-virtual-curtain-of-censorship.html.
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242

participation in Internet censorship,
and members such as
Representative Christopher Smith have introduced legislation that
243
would ban these sales. Nongovernmental organizations such as
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Reporters
244
Without Borders
have attacked sales to censoring countries.
Owners of Web sites targeted for blocking have protested, and even
245
offered guides to bypassing censorship. Although corporations
concede the need for some constraints, they advocate for selfregulation through voluntary codes of conduct, intergovernmental
246
efforts to press for openness, and treating filtering as a trade
247
barrier.
Operating in or trading with a country that censors online
content can create conflicts: companies have a duty to shareholders to
248
pursue profitable transactions. But their corporate values—and the
values of the countries in which they are based—may counsel against
249
such sales. For example, Microsoft opted not to locate its Chineselanguage Hotmail servers within China to avoid state demands for
250
private user data, even though doing so would lessen the technical
251
problems that occasionally plague Hotmail. Yahoo!, in contrast,

242. Anne Broache, Politicos Attack Tech Firms over China, CNET NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028_3-6033976.html.
243. See Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007).
244. See, e.g., Verena Dobnik, 13 Nations Denounced for Web Censorship, MSNBC.COM,
Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15621193.
245. See, e.g., Jardin, supra note 237; Boing Boing, BoingBoing’s Guide to Defeating
Censorware, http://www.boingboing.net/censorroute.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
246. See, e.g., Foster Klug, U.S. Tech Companies Urge Washington to Confront China on
Internet Censorship, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 4 2007, http://www.post-gazette.com/
pg/07035/758377-96.stm.
247. Id. (quoting Andrew McLaughlin, senior counsel for Google, testifying that Google
wants censorship to be treated as a trade barrier); see also Tim Wu, The World Trade Law of
Censorship and Internet Filtering, 7 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 263, 276–80 (2006) (analyzing whether
internet filtering violates trade laws).
248. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (holding that
corporations are organized for the purpose of shareholder profit, and that directors must pursue
this goal); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548–49 (2003).
249. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
250. Rebecca MacKinnon, America’s Online Censors, NATION, Feb. 24, 2006, http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20060313/mackinnon (noting that Microsoft’s instant messaging and
Hotmail services are “hosted on servers outside of China so it doesn’t have to hand over data”).
251. Sumner Lemon, Microsoft Restores Hotmail Service in China, INFOWORLD, May 22,
2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/05/22/78548_HNhotmailchina_1.html (discussing
recent Hotmail problems in China).
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placed its e-mail servers inside China, improving service but making it
easier for security services to get the company to disclose user
information. This information has been used to convict and imprison
252
at least four dissidents. The tension is clear: offering Internet
services from outside China reduces their performance and hence
their attractiveness (some Chinese users switched from Hotmail to
253
Google’s Gmail due to outages), but locating servers within the
country increases the risk that a technology company may assist
political repression.
This challenge of deciding when to help censor becomes
particularly acute when the filtering country represents an important
market (China boasts the greatest number of Internet users of any
254
nation) or when ethical behavior is particularly significant to a
company (Google’s philosophy includes, “You can make money
255
without doing evil.”) Many technology companies have a core
business function of making information easier to access, and filtering
runs counter to this basic goal. Though Yahoo! believes “information
is power” and commits to “open access to information and
256
communication on a global basis,” the company censors its Chinese
search engine. Indeed, Yahoo! filters out more results than either
257
Google or Microsoft.
How a company reconciles its choices with corporate values is up
to each firm. Those decisions, however, will be challenged by

252. Rebecca MacKinnon et al., “Race to the Bottom”: Corporate Complicity in Chinese
Internet Censorship: How Multinational Internet Companies Assist Government Censorship in
China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 2006, at 1, 31, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2006/china0806/china0806web.pdf (discussing Yahoo’s role in the convictions of four Chinese
dissidents); Yahoo Criticized in Case of Jailed Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at C3 (noting
that Democratic Representative Tom Lantos of California criticized Yahoo! CEO Jerry Yang
and General Counsel Michael J. Callahan during a House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting).
253. Sumner Lemon, Microsoft’s Hotmail Problems Persist in China, COMPUTERWORLD,
May 18, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9000605/Microsoft_s_Hotmail_problems
_persist_in_China (discussing how one Chinese Hotmail user switched to Google’s Gmail
service because of Hotmail’s technical problems).
254. Calum MacLeod, China Vaults Past USA in Internet Users, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2008,
at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/world/2008-04-20-Internetusers_N.htm.
255. Google, Corporate Information, Our Philosophy, http://www.google.com/corporate/
tenthings.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
256. Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo!: Our Beliefs as a Global Internet Company (Feb. 13,
2006), available at http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=187
401.
257. Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 3 (finding that Yahoo! blocked 20.8 percent of sites
tested on average, while Google filtered 15.2 percent and Microsoft filtered 15.7 percent).
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observers ranging from activists to government officials. Employing a
rigorous, defensible, public methodology for decisions will improve a
company’s ability to justify its actions. Companies could use the
Framework introduced in this Article to assess a country’s censorship,
and incorporate this analysis into the company’s decision whether to
sell filtering technology there. The Global Network Initiative
expressly requires participating companies to make such assessments
before entering new markets, and mandates that they review policies
258
in existing ones. Using the Framework to guide decisions on where
to do business would enable companies to make more responsible
decisions and to use their analysis to justify choices if challenged.
Technology firms appear to prefer self-regulation to independent
review through efforts such as the Global Network Initiative. Even
self-regulation, though, implies that corporations must assess
internally whether to sell filtering technology. It also implies that
some countries are not suitable customers. Self-regulation is
suboptimal for two reasons. First, firms face pressure to resolve
doubts in favor of consummating deals. Corporate governance—at
least for American companies—centers on producing shareholder
259
value. Companies will pursue sales when their internal standards do
not clearly forbid them. Second, abstaining from questionable deals
becomes difficult in a competitive environment. Another company
may resolve doubts in favor of the sale, reaping benefits and placing
260
virtuous competitors at a disadvantage.
Firms also face
displacement by domestic producers friendly to filtering in some
markets, particularly China, which has moved to develop censorship
261
technologies.
Market pressures are likely to undercut selfregulation.
Companies inevitably face external pressures over their
decisions. Freedom of expression groups have begun to use market
pressures to push technology firms to consider filtering transactions

258. Global Network Initiative, supra note 220.
259. See supra note 248.
260. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age:
Forward, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 38 (2002) (discussing News Corporation’s
agreement to censor a controversial book and television channel in order to do business in
China).
261. See, e.g., Nart Villeneuve, 6/4 & Censorware (June 4, 2004), http://www.nartv.org/2004/
06/04/64-censorware (describing Filter King and Net Police 110 products).
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more carefully. These efforts include adopting codes of conduct,
263
factoring human rights explicitly into decisions, and forswearing
264
censorship altogether.
Tactics combine financial incentives
(including evaluation of filtering transactions in decisions on whether
265
to invest ) with corporate governance measures (attempting to
mandate consideration of human rights via committees empowered to
266
review a firm’s policies ) and public relations efforts (seeking to
267
embarrass directors and officers ). Investment firms have begun
scrutinizing filtering practices by American ISPs, as well as firms
268
operating abroad, using these methods. By using the Framework
internally to assess proposed transactions, companies create
defensible positions they can articulate to critics.
Even if firms adopt the Framework’s metrics to guide corporate
actions, there are still two ongoing risks: first, that companies will use
them as a cover rather than a genuine component of decisions, and
second, that firms will select (or create) metrics designed to legitimize
most, if not all, potential clients. These concerns are real, but they can
be mitigated. First, using the Framework commits companies to its
merit. It forces firms to defend the metrics they use, having conceded
the Framework’s applicability and the desirability of assessing their
conduct. Some measurement constrains better than none. Second,
outside watchdogs can check corporate conclusions both from an
internal perspective (is the transaction justified under the company’s

262. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, Joint Investor Statement on Freedom of
Expression and the Internet, http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/fonds-investissement-en.
php3 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing thirty-five investments firms that signed the statement of
principles).
263. See, e.g., Press Release, Boston Common Asset Mgmt. LLC, Human Rights and
Internet Fragmentation Proposal Receives Record Shareholder Support (Nov. 15, 2006),
http://www.bostoncommonasset.com/news/cisco-agm-111506.html.
264. See, e.g., Google, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Proposal Number 4,
(Mar. 25, 2008) (listing a shareholder proposal calling on Google “not [to] engage in pro-active
censorship”).
265. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, supra note 262.
266. See, e.g., Google, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Proposal Number 5
(Apr. 6, 2007) (proposing the establishment of a Board Committee on Human Rights
“authorized to review the implications of company policies, above and beyond matters of legal
compliance, for the human rights of individuals in the US and worldwide”).
267. See, e.g., Photo: Chinese Activists Protest Yahoo, CNET NEWS, Oct. 19, 2005,
http://news.cnet.com/2300-1028_3-5902094-1.html.
268. Press Release, Open MIC, OpenMIC Investor Coalition Files Shareholder Resolutions
with Internet Service Providers on Freedom of Expression and Privacy (Jan. 28, 2009), available
at http://www.openmic.org/node/196.
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own measurements?) and an external one (is that particular metric
defensible?). Other companies’ decisions, and justifications, will serve
as reference points.
There is value in framing the supply of Internet-restricting
technology by Western firms as a decision requiring analysis,
disclosure, and justification. Currently, technology companies are
opaque, or even misleading, about their relationships with filtering
269
countries. Companies can use the Framework to improve, and
defend, decisions about enabling censorship.
2. Public Regulation. The Framework can help governments
decide whether, and how, to limit firms’ ability to sell censorware. So
far, companies have generally resolved debates about supplying
filtering technology in favor of transactions, generating calls for
270
governmental regulation. Firms have variously supported and
271
opposed such legal rules.
Companies favor legislation as a
negotiating tool with countries, but are reluctant to accede to
272
regulation that may bar them from certain markets.
Nongovernmental organizations and experts line up on both sides of
the debate; some see legislation as necessary due to failure of private
273
274
ordering, and others view law as too blunt of a tool. Similarly,
269. See, e.g., Arnoldy, supra note 235 (noting that Secure Computing refused to confirm
transactions with Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and that Fortinet
misled researchers about sales to Burma).
270. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Proposed Law Targets Tech-China Cooperation, CNET
NEWS, Feb. 16, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/Proposed-law-targets-tech-China-cooperation/21001028_3-6040303.html (discussing the introduction of the first bill regulating how U.S. companies
interact with foreign governments).
271. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, “Internet Freedom” Bill Targeting China Cooperation
Faces Rough Road, CNET NEWS, May 28, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-995281538.html (noting Google’s support for and Microsoft’s opposition to the Global Online Freedom
Act of 2007).
272. See generally Anne Broache, Web Giants Ask for Feds’ Help on Censorship, CNET
NEWS, Jan. 30, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Web-giants-ask-for-feds-help-on-censorship/21001028_3-6154930.html (noting that tech companies, like Google, support U.S. laws classifying
censorship as a trade barrier).
273. See, e.g., MacKinnon et al., supra note 252; Press Release, Amnesty Int’l et al., NGO
Joint Statement in Support of H.R. 275 (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.
amnestyusa.org/Internet_Censorship/HR_275_Support/page.do?id=1081016 (sending a letter to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs supporting the Global Online Freedom Act of 2007
signed by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, China
Information Center, and the Religious Freedom Coalition).
274. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL ONLINE
FREEDOM ACT OF 2008 [H.R. 275] (2008), available at http://www.cdt.org/international/
censorship/20080505gofa.pdf (expressing concern about a specific bill); Brendan Ballou, Global
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scholars have varying receptivity to legislation regarding Internet
censorship, though most scholars see private corporate efforts as
275
inadequate. Whether regulation via public law is desirable at all is
contested, let alone the details of legislation.
The Framework can aid regulators in three ways. First,
governments can analyze other countries’ censorship to assess which
nations engage in illegitimate filtering and then limit transactions in
276
censorware with such countries. These countries could be targets of
a ban on filtering technology sales. Second, the new approach can
undercut objections to regulation. Lastly, the methodology can help
regulators choose among seller-side, buyer-side, or mixed restrictions.
Overall, the Framework best supports buyer-side restrictions and
improves regulators’ ability to craft such limits. Rules crafted using
the Framework would improve upon recent regulatory attempts.
a. Regulation by Public Law. Activists and legislators often
propose regulation via public law to limit firms’ transactions in
Internet censorship gear. There have been serious recent proposals
for U.S. legislation to regulate how technology companies sell
filtering technology, though none of the proposals has come close to
277
enactment. Some firms support such limits on their behavior (albeit

Online Freedom Act: Governments Can’t Protect Freedom by Themselves (July 24, 2008),
http://futureoftheinternet.org/global-online-freedom-act-governments-cant-protect-freedom-bythemselves (arguing that a specific bill may do more harm than good); John Palfrey, Leaked
Cisco Document: Chinese Censorship Among “Opportunities” (May 22, 2008),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/palfrey/2008/05/22/leaked-cisco-document-chinese-censorshipamong-opportunities (“I have not been a supporter of passing a law like the Global Online
Freedom Act in its current or historic form, because I think it would have too many unintended
consequences.”).
275. See, e.g., Surya Deva, Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China, 39 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 255, 315 (2007) (arguing that legislation is legitimate to enforce human
rights objectives, but the Global Online Freedom Act “is unlikely to achieve its objectives in its
current form”); Mark D. Nawyn, Code Red: Responding to the Moral Hazards Facing U.S.
Information Technology Companies in China, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 505, 549 (supporting
legislation generally but noting problems with the Act); cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by
Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 11, 100–01 (2006) (describing the risks of targeting Internet intermediaries via
regulation).
276. See infra Part III.C.2.c.
277. American firms and legislation have been the focus of such efforts, but there are
parallel concerns in other Western countries. For example, Nokia Siemens Networks, a Finnish
company, recently faced criticism for supplying technology enabling telephone surveillance to
Iran. Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran’s Web Spying Aided by Western Technology,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009, at A1. But see Press Release, Nokia Siemens Networks, Provision of
Lawful Intercept Capability to Iran (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.nokiasiemens
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weakly ), but many companies and commentators oppose them.
The Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, for example, sought to
develop minimum voluntary corporate standards on Internet
281
freedom;
identify Internet-restricting countries; prohibit U.S.
companies from storing personally identifiable information there or
282
from providing such information to those governments; require
American-owned search engines to provide the State Department
283
with terms and parameters used to alter search results; mandate that
284
U.S. companies provide the State Department with filtered URLs;
and ban blocking of U.S. government or government-funded Internet
285
content.
Objections made to the Global Online Freedom Act exemplify
the challenges of public regulation in this space. The State
Department argued that the bill would place American firms at a
286
competitive disadvantage. The Department of Justice raised several
concerns, including the concern that requiring ISPs to carry
information could implicate American free speech protections. The
Act’s definition of “Internet-restricting country” would likely include
countries in Western Europe that ban hate speech. And the Act’s
prohibition of the release of “personally identifiable information”
could trap technology companies between the Act and foreign laws

networks.com/global/Press/Press+releases/news-archive/Provision+of+Lawful+Intercept+
capability+in+Iran.htm (arguing that Nokia Siemens only provided Iran with the capability to
monitor local telephone calls and not Web filtering services).
278. See, e.g., Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra
note 214 (statement of Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google, Inc.).
279. See, e.g., Anne Broache, Politicos OK Limits for U.S. Firms in Net-Censoring Countries,
CNET NEWS, Oct. 23, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9802616-7.html (discussing
Microsoft and the Computer & Communications Industry Association).
280. See, e.g., Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra
note 214 (written statement of John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Colin Maclay, Berkman Center for
Internet & Society, Harvard Law School), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/palfrey/2008/
05/20/testimony-on-internet-filtering-and-surveillance/ (“[L]egal regimes cannot adequately
address the dilemmas posed by the rise of global filtering, censorship, and surveillance practices
worldwide, and are unlikely to be capable of doing so in the near term.”).
281. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007).
282. Id. § 202.
283. Id. § 203.
284. Id. § 204.
285. Id. § 205; see also Christopher Stevenson, Note, Breaching the Great Firewall: China’s
Internet Censorship and the Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 548–53 (2007) (analyzing the predecessor Act of 2006).
286. McCullagh, supra note 271.
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287

requiring disclosure.
These concerns, along with corporate
288
opposition, effectively destroyed the Act’s chances to become law.
As the Global Online Freedom Act furor demonstrates and the next
Section discusses, parochial issues, such as concerns about hobbling
domestic firms in the international marketplace, and a canonical set
of policy protests make public law regulation difficult.
b. Answering Objections. Public regulatory efforts to limit
transactions with censoring countries, such as the Global Online
Freedom Act, encounter objections along four fronts. First,
companies argue that information technology is virtually always dual289
use: it can be employed for ends both fair and foul. SmartFilter
blocks pornography, political sites, and sites that “offer[] different
290
interpretations of significant historical facts” with equal ease. Thus,
responsibility should be placed upon users rather than manufacturers.
Second, even if companies censor directly, they argue that a limited
platform for expression and information exchange is preferable to no
291
platform. Third, firms point to their obligation to obey local laws:
much as U.S. intellectual property law pushes Google to remove
search results that may infringe copyright, China requires it to delist
292
political opposition content. This hints at hypocrisy—why should
the United States complain about censorship when America has its
own content restrictions? Fourth, companies worry about

287. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Howard L. Berman, Acting
Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs (May 19, 2008), available at http://politechbot.com/
docs/doj.letter.gofa.052708.pdf.
288. See Declan McCullagh, White House Opposition Likely Dooms Anti-China Internet
Bill, CNET NEWS, May 30, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9956124-38.html
(predicting that the Bush Administration’s opposition “is likely to doom the legislation”).
289. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cool Tools for Tyrants, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, available
at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/feature_bambauer_janfeb06.msp.
290. See McAfee Secure Computing, supra note 113 (describing “Pornography,”
“Politics/Opinion,” and “Historical Revisionism” content categories).
291. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Yahoo on China: We’re Doing Some Good, ARS TECHNICA,
May 12, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/05/6823.ars; Alison Maitland, Skype Says
Texts Are Censored by China, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at 25, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/875630d4-cef9-11da-925d-0000779e2340.html; Andrew McLaughlin,
Google in China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, Jan. 27, 2006, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2006/01/google-in-china.html.
292. See, e.g., Tom Krazit, Google’s Censorship Struggles Continue in China, CNET NEWS,
June 16, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-10265123-2.html; G. Jeffrey MacDonald,
Congress’s Dilemma: When Yahoo in China’s Not Yahoo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 14,
2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0214/p01s04-usfp.html.
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displacement. If Cisco cannot sell filtering routers to China, then
Huawei may displace them from one of the world’s most lucrative
markets. Finally, laws on filtering require restricting access, but not
providing information, making compliance easier—and perhaps less
visible—for companies.
The Framework can help evaluate arguments on dual-use and
abiding by local law, and, by extension, the merits of claims that
293
export regulation should be minimized or prevented. Regarding the
legitimacy of dual-use technology, the Framework helps predict how
a country will actually use the technology it procures. Firms generally
evade the issue of how a country is likely to employ its new
294
capabilities, which is precisely what the Framework helps uncover.
This predictive approach has helped regulate other dual-use
technologies. For example, U.S. law prevents handgun sales to
295
felons, but not to fearful homeowners. Companies are liable for
296
products intended or designed to infringe copyrights, but not for
297
those capable of “substantial noninfringing uses.”
The legitimacy of selling dual-use technology can be assessed by
examining two factors. First, how is the filtering country likely to use
the new gear? Cisco had to know that its Policenet system would be
used by China not just for crime prevention, but for political
298
control. Second, will the new technology expand the country’s
capabilities, allowing it to broaden censorship? And is it inclined to

293. The other two contentions are beyond the methodology’s reach. Whether a country has
a sufficiently developed domestic technology industry to sustain filtering without outside
assistance is an empirical question. Whether a censored Internet shaped with Western
technology is better than one without is a philosophical question, though recent data suggests
Chinese Internet users have access to 20 percent more Web content on controversial topics due
to the presence of Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 17.
294. They also elide the question of initial design: when a manufacturer knows a product can
be used for multiple purposes—some legitimate and some not—should that producer design it
to minimize harmful uses? See Bambauer, supra note 289; Brief of Amici Curiae Emerging
Technology Companies in Support of Respondents at 21–25, MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545
U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480).
295. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2006).
296. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919 (“One who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”);
see also A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the award of a
preliminary injunction against an online file-sharing technology company).
297. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
298. See, e.g., GUTMANN, supra note 233, at 167–71; Rebecca MacKinnon, More on Cisco in
China (June 30, 2005), http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2005/06/more_on_cisco_i.
html.
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do so? Ethiopia blocks some content critical of its government on
political and human rights grounds, and it would clearly prefer to
expand its filtering. But the state-owned ISP in Ethiopia lacks the
299
sophistication to do so. Thus, selling a comprehensive filtering
solution to Ethiopia would likely expand the country’s censorship,
decreasing its legitimacy. The Framework’s analysis reveals what a
country does with existing capabilities, and how legitimate those
actions are. Thus, regulators can look to this track record to assess the
propriety of selling new gear to that nation. In this way, the
Framework can help evaluate the desirability of dual-use sales.
Technology companies reiterate their need to comply with local
300
laws and regulations where they operate. This position is a truism—
companies are expected to operate lawfully—and also a means of
shifting attention from their actions to those of the censoring country.
But this argument binds companies as much as it frees them; it
requires that a firm’s actions comport with express laws or
regulations, and not merely governmental preference. Companies,
though, are highly responsive to informal government pressures on
301
302
filtering. This is the case not only in China, but also in Britain,
303
304
305
Denmark, Sweden, and the United States. The Framework’s
methodology can help outside analysts evaluate whether technology
companies are simply following the rules or are currying favor by
blocking sensitive content while hiding behind legalistic justifications.
299. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, ETHIOPIA 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/
files/ONI_Ethiopia_2007.pdf (describing Ethiopia’s hit or miss Internet censorship, in which
some sports enthusiasts’ blogs are blocked while some opposition political sites remain
accessible); Andrew Heavens, You Block Blogspot, I Block Boing Boing (Oct. 8, 2007),
http://www.meskelsquare.com/archives/2007/10/ethiopia_blocks.html.
300. See, e.g., Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra
note 214 (statement of Michael Samway, Vice President & Deputy General Counsel, Yahoo!
Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3369&wit_id=7182;
Frank Davies, Holding Their Feet to the Fire: Google, Yahoo, Cisco Face Angry Senators on
Rights of Users in Repressive Nations, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 21, 2008, at 1C; Matt
Marshall, Microsoft and Bokee Mired in Chinese Free-Speech Controversy, MERCURY NEWS,
Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.siliconbeat.com/entries/2006/01/04/microsoft_and_bokee_mired_in_
chinese_freespeech_controversy.html; Google to Censor Itself in China, CNN.COM, Jan. 26,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/BUSINESS/01/25/google.china/.
301. See, e.g., supra notes 271, 300.
302. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
303. Filter Blocks Danes from Accessing Child Pornography, FIN. MIRROR, Nov. 28, 2005.
304. Press Release, Telenor, Telenor and Swedish National Criminal Investigation
Department to Introduce Internet Child Porn Filter (May 17, 2005), available at http://
press.telenor.com/PR/200505/994781_5.html.
305. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
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Companies also worry about being displaced by competitors.
Unilateral limits on American firms could lead a country to substitute
products or services from companies in nations with more lax
regulation. Companies might also evade restrictions through clever
restructuring. Yahoo! runs its operations in China through Alibaba, a
Chinese corporation in which Yahoo! holds a 40 percent ownership
306
stake. This enables Yahoo! to comply with China’s censorship
demands while shifting responsibility to Alibaba (which cooperates
307
enthusiastically). In addition, the Justice Department’s objection
picks up on a potential inconsistency: it seeks to hamper Internet
308
censorship abroad without examining relevant American practices.
Finally, American companies can comply with local laws
mandating censorship because they are tilted toward filtering:
blocking material is either required or optional, but there are no
affirmative requirements to make information available. The
Framework thus helps moderate the force of standard objections to
regulating sales of censorship technology by assessing their merit
more clearly.
c. Selecting Targets. Lastly, the Framework can help in making
the choice among regulatory targets. Public law regulation of
technology transactions can focus on sellers, buyers, or both. The
Framework suggests that buyer-side restraints are likely best and
most effective; moreover, the process-based approach makes
implementing such restrictions more feasible.
Constraining sellers’ behavior limits what one can send abroad—
for example, American companies must obtain permission before
309
exporting strong encryption technologies. Limiting buyers prevents
firms from conducting business in certain countries. American
regulation of technology transactions employs both modes. The
United States bans most trade to countries seen as sponsors of
310
terrorism, such as Iran. U.S. companies cannot export goods or
306. Tom Zeller, Jr., Internet Firms Facing Questions About Censoring Online Searches in
China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at C3.
307. See Stuart Biggs, Under Oath and Under Pressure, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21,
2006, at 1 (quoting Alibaba’s chief executive as saying “[w]e are very co-operative with the
authorities”).
308. Frank Davies, Internet Freedom: Pressure Growing, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July
22, 2006, at A1 (quoting former CNN Beijing bureau chief Rebecca MacKinnon as calling the
Act’s 2006 predecessor “hypocritical and arrogant” for this reason).
309. 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(2) (2009).
310. See id. §§ 742.8, 746.7.
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services to Cuba without a license from the Department of
311
Commerce (which customarily denies applications), and foreign
firms that do business there face penalties if a transaction involves
312
property confiscated by Cuba’s government.
There are also
313
technology-specific embargoes on nations such as China. Even these
limits have exceptions and uncertainties. Cisco sells police
technologies to China’s state security forces that may run afoul of the
post-Tiananmen Square statute limiting such exchanges—though
314
Cisco argues that they do not.
Targeting sellers is much more challenging for regulators, for
three reasons. First, regulating dual-use technology is hard, as
previously discussed. Second, seller-side restrictions run counter to
the goals of potential customers, who may pressure companies to
evade the regulation or opt for non-U.S. providers. Finally, Internet
censorship is dynamic, and public law regulation is relatively static.
Even well-crafted laws may rapidly become irrelevant. Regulations
designed for Web sites may struggle with new issues specific to usergenerated video (consider YouTube) or text messaging (think
315
Twitter).
Regulating buyers is the better path, and the Framework can
help by enabling evaluation of whether purchasers of censorship
technology use it for legitimate purposes. The more legitimate the

311. Id. § 746.2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY,
2004 REPORT ON FOREIGN POLICY-BASED EXPORT CONTROLS 40 (2005), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/05forpolcontrols/04finalfpreport.pdf (stating that
the Department “generally denies license applications for exports” of most items to Cuba,
subject to certain “case-by-case” exceptions).
312. 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2006); see also, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, and
Speech Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A16 (describing the actions of the U.S.
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control to block access to the website of a British national
organizing trips to Cuba for European tourists).
313. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990–1991, Pub. L. No. 101246 § 902(a)(4), 104 Stat. 15, 83 (1990) (suspending export licenses for crime control and
detection equipment to China after the Tiananmen Square repression of 1989).
314. Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra note 214,
at 88 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President Legal Servs., General Counsel and
Secretary, Cisco Systems, Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-05-20Mark_
Chandler_Testimony.pdf; see also Bambauer, supra note 289.
315. See Ryan Singel, Seeking Tighter Censorship, Repressive States Target Web 2.0 Apps,
WIRED, Mar. 4, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/03/etech-what-happ.html; Ethan
Zuckerman, The Cute Cat Theory Talk at ETech (Mar. 8, 2008), http://www.ethanzuckerman.
com/blog/2008/03/08/the-cute-cat-theory-talk-at-etech/ (discussing censorship of Web 2.0
technologies and describing a Tunisian video mash-up of Apple’s famous “1984” ad used to
criticize President Ben Ali).
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restrictions, the fewer concerns regulators should have about private
firms supporting them. The Framework provides a yardstick to assess
countries’ behavior, and hence whether corporations should transact
business with them. Metrics-based analysis gives regulators more
information to evaluate the problem (suspect sales, such as Fortinet’s
to Burma, may be unusual) and, if necessary, to craft a response.
Moreover, the Framework should help simplify any regulation that
develops. It is easier to forbid selling filtering technology to
Uzbekistan than to define what personally identifiable information
316
can be stored there.
Buyer-targeted regulation offers ancillary benefits such as lower
administrative and enforcement costs. For example, American
317
companies cannot lawfully sell software to Iran. Secure Computing
has stated that the SmartFilter software used by Iranian ISPs such as
318
ParsOnline is unauthorized.
If the company had sold SmartFilter to ParsOnline, the violation
319
would be clear and inexpensive to detect. In contrast, the legality of
320
sales to China depends upon the products involved. Whether sales
of Cisco’s Policenet to China contravene export restrictions depends
partly on whether Cisco developed the system’s database and partly
321
on whether Policenet is an “identification retrieval system.” This
determination is not only unclear prospectively, it is a complex
question that is costly to adjudicate. Regulation that is focused on the

316. Cf. Jeffrey Gedmin, Reporting Among Gangsters, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at A15
(describing the Uzbek regime as authoritarian and prone to human rights abuses).
317. 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2008); see also Sun Microsystems, Embargoed Countries, http://
www.sun.com/sales/its/countries/Embargoed.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing Iran as an
embargoed country).
318. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN IRAN 2004–2005, at n.1 (2005),
http://opennet.net/studies/iran#1.
319. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 118, § 4.C.2.c (describing test used to
determine if an ISP uses SmartFilter).
320. See Keith Bradsher, At Trade Show, China’s Police Shop for the West’s Latest, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at C1.
321. 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, ECCN no. 3A981 (2008) (identifying “automated fingerprint
and identification retrieval systems” as controlled for crime control reasons under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR)); see also MacKinnon, supra note 298 (alleging that Cisco
“appear[s] to be directly flaunting” United States export restrictions by advertising its products
for use by police in China and by building the structure of the Chinese police database); 15
C.F.R. § 738 Supp. 1 (identifying the export to China of items classified as crime control 1 as
subject to EAR license requirements); id. § 742.7(a)(1) (defining the export of technology
classified as crime control as subject to regulation under the EAR); Bambauer, supra note 289
(suggesting that Policenet may have been used to apprehend political prisoner Zheng Yichun).
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legitimacy of the buyer’s censorship is not only easier to comply with
but also cheaper to enforce.
Gathering additional information could improve regulation by
providing more data to analyze using the Framework’s metrics.
Moreover, the Framework can suggest likely initial targets for
mandatory data provision efforts. First, if regulators consider
seriously regulating technology sales to filtering countries, they
should gather data that would improve policymaking via mandatory,
limited disclosure of corporate transactions. To assess whether public
law is necessary, regulators need accurate information on the scope of
the activity at issue. Corporations, though, are loath to provide
322
specifics about sales of filtering technology. Determining this data
323
from public filings or statements can be difficult or impossible. A
confidential reporting system would improve regulatory decisions.
Crafting the disclosure system would require care to avoid
collecting irrelevant data (exposing companies to unnecessary cost)
and to avoid missing relevant transactions (depriving regulators of
useful information). Limiting the number of countries for mandatory
reporting would be useful. Studying transactions with Mexico, which
324
does not censor the Internet, would not help; capturing data about
Vietnam would. To choose which countries to target, the system
could select countries in which, according to the Framework, online
restraints fall below a minimum threshold of legitimacy.
Alternatively, the State Department could select the countries based
325
on its annual Human Rights Reports, or the system could target
326
states identified as repressing Internet content or with documented
327
instances of Internet filtering.

322. See, e.g., Arnoldy, supra note 235; Bambauer, supra note 289 (noting that Cisco does
not disclose sales figures for China).
323. Secure Computing, for example, discloses only that 36 percent of 2007 revenues came
from international sales, and that major foreign markets include China. Secure Computing
Corp. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29 (Mar. 5, 2008).
324. Kathleen Connors et al., OpenNet Initiative, Latin America, http://opennet.net/
research/regions/la (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
325. U.S. Dep’t of State, Human Rights, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009).
326. Reporters Without Borders, List of the 13 Internet Enemies (Nov. 7, 2006)
http://www.rsf.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=19603 (maintaining a list of countries that
“systematically violate online free expression”).
327. E.g., Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 11, at 103; Opennet Initiative, Research, http://
opennet.net/research (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
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Some technology is irrelevant to Internet filtering—for example,
Apple’s iPhone—and should be excluded from reporting. To address
dual-use items, regulators should again focus on buyers. A simple and
cheap, though admittedly imperfect, rule would mandate submitting
data about sales to government agencies or service providers in
targeted countries, or about transactions in which the reporting entity
328
acts as an online service provider. To avoid evasion, providers could
be required to obtain, and report, data from distributors and
subsidiaries.
A disclosure requirement—however limited—is likely to be
opposed by technology companies. Regulation that focuses on buyers,
however, combined with clear requirements from the Framework’s
metrics, will make mandatory information provision less onerous.
Past attempts to require disclosure of transactions with “terrorist329
330
sponsoring states” or potential environmental liabilities elicited
substantial corporate opposition. There are, however, analogous
programs designed to improve public regulation that suggest that this
reporting system need not be onerous or risky for firms. For example,
the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) collects information
about civil judgments, settlements, and criminal convictions against
331
physicians and health care providers for malpractice. Insurers and
332
other payers must report data to the NPDB. The general public
cannot access these records, but regulators such as state licensing
333
boards, professional societies, and federal agencies can. Regulators
have used NPDB data to analyze such regulatory questions as the
334
role of malpractice insurance premiums in rising health care costs,

328. The regulation could incorporate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s definition of
“service provider.” See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2006).
329. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Rethinks Lists Linking Companies and Terrorist States,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C2.
330. See, e.g., William Baue, SEC Urged to Strengthen Rules Governing Corporate
Disclosure of Environmental Risks, SOCIALFUNDS, Aug. 21, 2002, http://www.socialfunds.com/
news/article.cgi/911.html; Barnaby J. Feder, New Battles over Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1990, at F10.
331. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–34 (2006); see also
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., National Practitioner Data Bank, http://www.npdbhipdb.hrsa.gov/npdb.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
332. 42 U.S.C. § 11131.
333. Id. § 11137.
334. U.S. GAO, NO. GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE passim (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d03836.pdf.
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and whether to limit damages in medical malpractice lawsuits.
Regulators gain access to data otherwise unavailable (settlement
agreements are typically confidential), whereas participants remain
shielded from public scrutiny. There are similar systems for reporting
336
storage of toxic chemicals
and “near miss” aviation safety
337
Disclosure of transactions involving censorship
incidents.
technology would improve regulators’ ability to determine whether
such sales are problematic and develop a response if necessary.
Confidentiality would protect companies from reputational harm,
thereby reducing their opposition and making the system more viable
politically.
***
Regulating information technology transactions is difficult
substantively and politically. The Framework can help regulators
determine whether public law constraints on corporate transactions
with censoring countries are necessary by analyzing how those
customers employ the gear. Its methodology helps address objections
based on the challenges of dual-use technology and obeying local law,
and suggests that focusing on buyers is the optimal regulatory
strategy.
3. Third-Party Evaluation. Filtering opens countries to an array
338
of external criticism, including Slashdot discussions,
State
339
340
Department reports, press freedom analysis, and United Nations

335. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Enters Fray over Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2003, at A24 (citing NPDB data on average malpractice judgment awards).
336. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2008); 40 C.F.R. § 372.1 (2008); see also U.S. EPA, What Is the
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/whatis.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2009). Toxics data is publicly available, though. See MARY GRAHAM,
DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE 21–61 (2002).
337. NASA, ASRS—Aviation Safety Reporting System, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/
summary.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). While incident reports to ASRS are voluntary, they
are confidential, and policymakers employ them in crafting regulations. NASA, PUB. 60, ASRS:
THE CASE FOR CONFIDENTIAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS 7 (2001), available at http://
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/60_Case_for_Confidential_Incident_Reporting.pdf.
338. See, e.g., Three ISPs Agree to Block Child Porn, SLASHDOT, June 10, 2008, available at
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/06/10/1819200.
339. See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 325.
340. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, Dictatorships Get to Grips with Web 2.0 (Feb. 1,
2007), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20844.
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341

evaluations,
among others. Internet censorship has received
increased attention in recent years from evaluators such as the U.S.
342
Department of State. There are many organizations that evaluate
censorship, freedom of expression, press freedom, and related issues,
including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters
Without Borders, International Freedom of Expression Exchange
(IFEX), the U.S. State Department, and the U.N. Human Rights
Council. Their assessments employ different methodologies—from
343
legal probes of a country’s censorship to limited quantitative
344
345
analysis to careful empirical testing. This methodological diversity
can paint a more complete picture, but it makes comparison
challenging. (Indeed, it can complicate assessing a single country
because groups emphasize various factors: Venezuela does not filter,
346
but its media restrictions and informal pressures on independent
347
348
journalists limit Internet freedom of expression.) By using the
process-oriented Framework methodology, third parties can take
different normative positions on filtering and on how a country
implements it, while increasing their assessments’ rigor and improving
comparability.
349
For example, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) classifies
countries it regards as violating freedom of expression or the press
350
online as either Internet Enemies or Under Surveillance. At the

341. See, e.g., UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW—TUNISIA 10, 12 (2008).
342. Bradley Graham, Violence Said to Slow Rights Effort in Iraq: Report Lauds Steps
Toward Democracy, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A15 (quoting the Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights on “growing attention to government censorship of the Internet”).
343. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET IN
CHINA 2–6 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/08/01/freedom-expressionand-internet-china (analyzing Chinese laws used to regulate Internet content).
344. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, Test of Filtering by Sohu and Sina Search
Engines Following Upgrade (June 22, 2006), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=18015.
But see Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 21 (describing problems with the study’s methodology).
345. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 116.
346. Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression (May 21,
2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/22/venezu15986.htm.
347. See, e.g., Simon Romero, Chavez Looks at His Critics in the Media and Sees the Enemy,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at A6.
348. OPENNET INITIATIVE, VENEZUELA (2007), http://opennet.net/research/profiles/
venezuela.
349. Reporters Without Borders is better known as Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF); the
organization is based in France.
350. See supra note 326.
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extremes, it is difficult to quarrel with RSF’s sorting: North Korea’s
Internet censorship trumps Jordan’s. But the organization’s
methodology is less clear in the middle. RSF lists Egypt as an Internet
Enemy, while classifying Tajikistan as Under Surveillance, a lesser
designation. In contrast, OpenNet Initiative finds that Egypt does not
filter, although bloggers and journalists have been imprisoned or
351
352
harassed, but finds that Tajikistan filters political content. What
353
354
makes Egypt’s online controls worse than Tajikistan’s, or viceversa? Assessments of Internet content control would improve with a
consistent methodology that does not depend on what material is
restricted and that reveals how RSF classifies countries. Employing
the Framework here would improve analytical coherence.
External evaluations of censorship face at least two challenges.
First, a country may simply (and perhaps plausibly) claim that its
355
filtering prevents social harms and is thereby justified. Second, the
country may critique its critics, charging that they too engage in such
356
practices and consequently are hypocritical. China recently rebutted
American criticism of its human rights record by pointing to U.S.
abuse of prisoners held at military bases in Guantanamo Bay and
Iraq, as well as America’s surveillance of international
357
communications. These responses achieve two ends: mitigating
negative analysis by showing that questionable practices are
358
widespread and reducing a critic’s credibility. In the filtering
context, countries such as China frequently point to other nations’

351. OPENNET INITIATIVE, EGYPT (2009), http://opennet.net/research/profiles/egypt.
352. OPENNET INITIATIVE, TAJIKISTAN (2007), http://opennet.net/research/profiles/
tajikistan.
353. Reporters Without Borders, Internet Enemies: Egypt (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a38f987c.html.
354. Reporters Without Borders, Countries Under Surveillance—Tajikistan, http://arabia.
reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=26127 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
355. For a discussion of Vietnamese claims regarding censorship, see supra note 87.
356. Cf. David J. Rothkopf, Values Conundrum: Will the U.S. and China Play by the Same
Rules?, WASH. POST, July 11, 2005, at A15 (“The first step is recognizing everyone's
hypocrisy.”).
357. See, e.g., Calum MacLeod, China: U.S. Criticism of Human Rights Record Is
“Hypocrisy,” USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2006, at 9A.
358. See, e.g., Frank Davies, U.S. Criticizes Abuses of Human Rights but It Has Used Many
of the Same Tactics, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 1, 2005, at A5 (noting the U.S. State
Department’s criticism of Pakistan, Egypt, and Syria for employing methods that the U.S.
employed when interrogating captives).
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practices and portray their own efforts as similar. The Framework
addresses both issues. It offers a consistent means to evaluate
Internet censorship by all countries, distinguishing legitimate from
illicit practices. In addition, its analysis reveals how well a government
sets forth the harms it seeks to prevent and how well filtering targets
them.
If third-party analysts moved toward convergent criteria for
measuring Internet censorship, it would be easier to compare—and
critique—their evaluations. Freedom House and OpenNet Initiative
both describe how they rate countries (Freedom House, for press
360
361
freedom; ONI, for Internet filtering ). Thus, one can compare
Freedom House’s negative evaluation of Oman with ONI’s relatively
362
positive one. It is possible to reconstruct these conclusions based on
each organization’s methodology, and to see how differences result
from their distinct analytical focus. Oman suppresses little speech
technologically (ONI), but much via legal, economic, and informal
pressures (Freedom House).
One criticism is that this proposal assumes away the problem: the
difficulty lies in convincing organizations with different goals and
values to adopt a similar methodology. This critique is partly correct:
some evaluators might not be concerned with accountability, or might
ground their analysis in substantive principles. There are two reasons
for optimism, though. First, because it is process-focused, the
Framework is compatible with disparate normative views on content
restrictions. The Framework clarifies what restraints exist and how
they are determined, without taking a content-based position.
Second, analysts and commentators frequently advert to the
363
Framework’s criteria. Openness, transparency, narrowness, and

359. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Defends Internet Censorship, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb.
14, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/14/business/net.php (quoting an official
in the Information Office of the Chinese State Council that, in view of “the main international
practices in this regard, you will find that China is basically in compliance with the international
norm”).
360. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: METHODOLOGY (2007),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=350&ana_page=339&year=2007.
361. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 5–27.
362. Compare FREEDOM HOUSE, MAP OF PRESS FREEDOM: OMAN (2007),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7246&year=2007
(labeling
Oman as “Not Free,” and ranking it 165 out of 195 countries), with OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra
note 179 (noting that Oman has highly transparent and consistent filtering).
363. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN ASIA 11 (2009), http://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Asia_2009.pdf (evaluating the transparency of the Thai
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accountability comprise the most commonly expressed principles
used to analyze Internet censorship. This increases the likelihood that
the Framework will be broadly acceptable.
Finally, watchdogs should use the Framework for positive
reinforcement as well as criticism. Organizations should use metrics
to confer recognition—their “seal of approval”—on countries that
score as legitimate as well as technology companies that engage in
transactions only with these nations. This certification approach has
many analogues. Web sites can obtain certification from the Better
364
365
Business Bureau
and TRUSTe
for meeting data privacy
requirements. Agricultural vendors can emblazon their coffee beans,
flowers, and chocolate with a Fair Trade Certified logo if they
purchase from growers who meet environmental and economic
366
standards. Forest products, such as paper and wood, and the land
management that produces them, can obtain certification from
monitors accredited by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). These
certifiers implement FSC’s criteria and standards but employ their
367
own methodology for evaluating compliance. Certification systems
provide positive incentives to engage in desired behaviors as well as
negative incentives to avoid unfavorable ones. In effect, the rating
entity lends its prestige to the companies it certifies. Similarly,

legal process for implementing selective “geolocational filtering”); MacKinnon et al., supra note
252, at 87 (urging the Chinese government to create a transparent process for the public to
challenge censorship decisions); FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 360 (evaluating a country’s press
freedoms based on the transparency of media ownership structures); Villeneuve, supra note 100
(specifically noting that the Chinese government’s process for determining which material
should be censored lacks both transparency and accountability); Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note
11, at 115–16, 238 (noting that when local authorities require Microsoft to block content,
Microsoft makes efforts to make this process transparent); Joint Declaration of the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media & Reporters Sans Frontières on Guaranteeing Media
Freedom on the Internet (June 18, 2005), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/declaration_anglais.pdf
(stressing that proceedings to determine the legality of Web site content should guarantee
transparency and accountability).
364. Better Bus. Bureau, BBB Online Business Program, http://www.bbb.org/us/bbb-onlinebusiness/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
365. TRUSTe Homepage, http://www.truste.org/businesses/web_privacy_seal.php (last
visited Oct. 23, 2009). But see Ben Edelman, Certifications and Site Trustworthiness (Sept. 25,
2005), http://www.benedelman.org/news/092506-1.html (finding that 5.4 percent of TRUSTe’s
certified Web sites are labeled untrustworthy by SiteAdvisor, versus 2.5 percent of Web sites
listed overall).
366. See TransFair USA, Fair Trade Certification Overview, http://www.transfairusa.org/
content/certification/overview.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
367. Forest Stewardship Council, What Is “Certification”?, http://www.fscus.org/faqs/what_
is_certification.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
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filtering certifications could be touted by countries in international
fora (such as the Internet Governance Forum, or the U.N. Human
Rights Council) or by companies when criticized.
Seals of approval for filtering countries or companies assisting
them will encounter at least two objections. First, some critics will
disapprove of conferring any legitimacy upon online censorship.
Although it is defensible, this position runs counter to strong support
in most countries for restricting access to certain material. Moreover,
public support means that governments are likely to censor, and the
goal of certification is to press them to do so with maximal legitimacy.
Second, there is a risk of strategic behavior. Countries and
companies will probably either turn to or create friendly rating
entities to award certification on easy terms. This may be particularly
problematic during the early phase of evaluation, when third-party
observers have not yet established sufficient recognition or credibility
368
to counteract technological “greenwashing.” If observers look
369
merely for a label, rather than its backer, this tactic can succeed.
This problem, however, can be mitigated. Organizations with credible
reputations, such as Human Rights Watch or the Center for
Democracy & Technology, should leverage existing recognition in the
new zone of filtering certification. Greenwashing, or its censorship
equivalent, is in itself a partial victory: it occurs when companies
recognize that reputation in an area such as environmental practices
370
motivates economic decisions by consumers. It signifies a shift in
expectations about acceptable behavior. Similarly, even weak
certifications commit companies to the principle that legitimacy in
Internet censorship is important but uncertain, and their decisions to
support it are properly subject to outside review. Public scrutiny can

368. See, e.g., TERRACHOICE, THE “SIX SINS OF GREENWASHING” 2–4 (2007), available at
http://www.terrachoice.com/files/6_sins.pdf. See generally John M. Conley & Cynthia A.
Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social
Responsibility Movement, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 18–20 (2005) (observing that watchdog
organizations like Greenpeace must take care to “avoid complicity” in corporate efforts to
conceal “environmental malfeasance”).
369. But see Eric Pfanner, Cooling Off on Dubious Eco-Friendly Claims, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 2008, at C3 (noting that consumers have become skeptical of misleading claims of
environmental friendliness).
370. See generally Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure,
and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 287–94 (2005) (arguing that firms
“actively compete on the basis of ethical commitments” when their conduct is made
transparent).
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help convert these rhetorical commitments to action, even if it is
limited.
The Framework improves third-party analysis of Internet
censorship by making it more consistent, rigorous, and readily
comparable. Outside groups should use the Framework’s results to
offer rewards that balance their critiques.
***
Metrics based on the Framework can help address three
challenging problems: (1) how corporations decide whether to help a
state censor the Internet; (2) whether a country should use public law
to regulate those companies’ decisions; and (3) how third parties
should evaluate filtering in a defensible, rigorous, reproducible, and
comparable way. The Framework is not a panacea, but it is a useful
tool for tackling each challenge.
IV. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
There are three important challenges that complicate application
of the Framework and metrics, namely, circumvention,
interdependence, and China. Circumvention—often portrayed
uncritically as an antidote to censorship—is more appropriately
assessed under the Framework’s rubric as well. The term covers a
371
panoply of technological methods that bypass online censorship.
With a tool such as Anonymizer, an Internet user can reach material
372
that is otherwise blocked. Circumvention includes using proxy
373
servers to fetch prohibited material on one’s behalf, routing
374
requests through specialized unfiltered network nodes such as Tor,
375
and accessing blocked pages from a search engine’s cache. Falun
Gong practitioners have developed sophisticated software tools to

371. See generally CITIZEN LAB, EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO BY-PASSING INTERNET
CENSORSHIP (2007), available at http://citizenlab.org/CL-circGuide-online.pdf (describing
several circumvention technologies such as Web tunneling software and anonymous
communication systems, as well as explaining their use).
372. See Anonymizer, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.anonymizer.com/company/
about/anonymizer-faq.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
373. See, e.g., Psiphon Homepage, http://psiphon.ca (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
374. See, e.g., Tor: Anonymity Online, http://www.torproject.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
375. See, e.g., OpenNet Initiative, Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China’s Great
Firewall (Sep. 3, 2004), http://opennet.net/bulletins/006.
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enable Chinese users to breach the country’s censorship, motivated
376
partly by China’s heavy filtering of Falun Gong content.
Circumvention is typically praised as online civil disobedience—
377
technological resistance to unjustified limits on information.
Circumvention’s legitimacy, however, depends upon the filtering it
subverts. Empowering Internet users to share information about
democracy is inspiring; enabling users to trade child pornography is
378
disturbing. Circumvention, like filtering, cuts both ways: it permits
users to bypass all content restrictions.
Like corporations offering technology to filter Internet content,
entities distributing circumvention tools should evaluate a country’s
censorship regime before helping citizens bypass it. If a country’s
decision to block access to certain material is legitimate, then helping
its users evade restrictions should be criticized, not celebrated. If the
United States passes legislation to block children’s access to sites
selling controlled substances without a prescription, helping children
379
bypass that filtering would likely be illegitimate. (This assumes that
the legislation is sufficiently transparent and narrow.) Thus, the
Framework can serve another purpose: to guide circumvention
designers and anticensorship activists as well as their opponents.
The second challenge is that the Framework’s four criteria are
interdependent. Accountability, for example, requires a level of free
information exchange that filtering impedes. It is difficult to assess a
country’s censorship from within—or to criticize it—if dissenting
views are blocked. In Russia, allies of the government have moved to
380
purchase existing media outlets and create new ones, enhancing
376. See, e.g., Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra
note 214, at 15–16 (statement of Shiyu Zhou, Ph.D.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3369&wit_id=7187 (describing FreeGate and UltraSurf programs);
OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13.
377. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 129; Tom Zeller, Jr., How to Outwit the World’s Internet
Censors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at C2.
378. See Robert Lemos, Tor Hack Proposed to Catch Criminals, SECURITYFOCUS, Mar. 8,
2007, http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11447.
379. See, e.g., Keep Internet Neighborhoods Safe: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10–14 (2007) (statement of Philip Heymann, Professor, Harvard
University Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2755
&wit_id=6468. The author of this Article acted as a technical advisor to the Internet Drugs
Expert Working Group that developed the proposal outlined by Heymann. See Drug Strategies,
Internet Drugs: Internet Expert Panel, http://www.drugstrategies.com/internetdrugs/iep.html#1
(last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
380. Anton Troianovski & Peter Finn, Kremlin Seeks to Extend Its Reach to Cyberspace,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at A1.
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progovernment viewpoints, and prosecutors have begun to apply
existing laws more stringently and frequently to bloggers and online
381
critics. A filtering system—even an imperfect one—can sufficiently
alter the information environment such that, although censorship
appears popular, accountability is significantly diminished.
Narrowness also affects the other factors. Overbroad filtering could
indicate incompetence, but probably means that a country is less than
forthright about what material it targets, reducing transparency and
openness. Thus, the four factors are not always separable; shifts in
one of the factors can (and perhaps should) alter the others.
Finally, the critical test case for evaluating Internet filtering’s
legitimacy is almost certainly China, which poses considerable
difficulties. First, Chinese citizens are divided over their government’s
proper role in shaping online content and the actions of American
382
technology companies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many
383
users hate Yahoo! and (perhaps grudgingly) like Microsoft;
empirical evidence from market share suggests that both play a far
smaller role in China’s online environment than domestic entities
384
such as Baidu. Any conclusion about how technology firms should
behave in China will be contested by Chinese users, among others.
Second, companies—and perhaps even governments—have
economic motivation to resolve doubts in favor of participating in
China’s burgeoning market. Although statistics are not entirely clear,
385
China appears to have the most Internet users and bloggers of any
country—an attractive target for technology providers. Companies
such as IBM have rushed to set up research labs there to tap its
technological talent and to build relationships that can lead to future
386
sales. Moreover, China’s censorship apparatus is itself a sales

381. See, e.g., Alex Rodriguez, Trial in Russia Sends Message to Bloggers, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
31, 2008, at C8.
382. Fallows, supra note 172.
383. Thompson, supra note 110.
384. See Baidu Leads China Web Search Market in Q4, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSSHA11273420080125 (listing Baidu at 60.1
percent market share, Google at 25.9 percent, and Yahoo! China at 9.6 percent).
385. Press Release, China Internet Network Info. Ctr., CNNIC Releases 2007 Survey
Report on China Weblog Market (Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.cnnic.cn/html/Dir/
2007/12/27/4954.htm (claiming that China has nearly 73 million blogs and 47 million bloggers).
386. See IBM, China Research Laboratory, http://www.research.ibm.com/beijing (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009).
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opportunity, as Cisco and Nortel Networks have realized.
Technology companies may be willing to forgo sales to Burma or
Sudan for ethical reasons, but China may be too lucrative to pass up.
Applying the framework to China’s Internet censorship will likely
produce a range of outcomes (though probably not wholehearted
approval). Firms will seize on any seemingly favorable—or even
neutral—assessments as justification for continued sales.
Lastly, China is probably the country where withdrawal of
Western technology firms would make the least difference to
filtering’s success. China is developing domestic censorship
technology for media from blogs to text messaging to cybercafé
388
computers.
Its citizens already prefer Chinese technology
389
providers. Western firms will use this possibility to bolster their case
for remaining engaged in China, even if its filtering program is
deemed illegitimate. Leaving, they will argue, will at best make no
difference to China’s Internet users, and at worst will deprive them of
services offered by companies more resistant to state demands than
390
locally based companies.
China poses difficult questions for the Framework and
technology companies alike. Though most commentators have been
critical of China’s filtering, conclusions should flow from analysis
391
under the Framework. (Tellingly, companies such as Google and
Microsoft do not defend China’s actions; instead, they claim that their
392
presence will mitigate filtering’s ill effects. ) Even if firms decide to
support China’s practices despite negative assessments, that does not
destroy the methodology’s value. Indeed, the contrast between
corporate choices and an objective, process-based evaluation would

387. See GREG WALTON, CHINA’S GOLDEN SHIELD: CORPORATIONS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 8, 14
(2001).
388. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13; Villeneuve, supra note 261.
389. See, e.g., supra note 384 and accompanying text.
390. Cf. Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 2 (noting that Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! have
all pledged to increase transparency regarding their censorship decisions but that the industry’s
overall transparency has declined).
391. See, e.g., Access to Information and Media Control in the People’s Republic of China,
supra note 78; Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Malte Ziewetz, Jefferson Rebuffed: The United
States and the Future of Internet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 188, 204 (2007);
Palfrey & Rogoyski, supra note 5, at 53–65.
392. See, e.g., Gates Defends China’s Internet Restrictions, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2006,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article721120.ece; McLaughlin,
supra note 291.
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provide critics with powerful ammunition. Finally, refusing to sell
Western hardware, software, and services to China might diminish
only slightly its censorship prowess, but inevitability does not erase
agency. The question is whether it is appropriate for firms to assist
China’s filtering, not whether they can prevent it. Substitution is not
acceptable in other contexts: North Korea will torture political
dissidents with or without Western assistance, but few firms would
393
consider it legitimate to sell its government thumbscrews.
Circumvention, interdependence, and China complicate the
application of the Framework, but do not diminish its utility. The
Framework opens a window onto a complex problem, and it can
clarify censorship’s challenges.
CONCLUSION
If Internet filtering were a stock, one would be well-advised to
buy it: online censorship is on the march, in democratic states as well
as in authoritarian ones. In the mid-1990s, a handful of countries used
technology to censor the Internet. By 2006–2007, over three dozen
394
tested by the OpenNet Initiative did so. Canada, Britain, France,
and Finland already filter; Australia, Japan, and America (among
others) are moving to do so. A country’s mode of governance is no
longer an accurate proxy for the legitimacy of its Internet restrictions.
Filtering is not limited to bad actors and repressive regimes.
Cybersieves are becoming commonplace.
This Article offers a new approach to evaluating Internet
filtering’s legitimacy by focusing on the process by which censorship
decisions are made. It proposes rating countries on the openness,
transparency, narrowness, and accountability of their practices. This
Framework seeks to engage a range of stakeholders—from
governments to activists to corporations—in assessing filtering
through quantitative metrics based on its four principles. The
Framework also seeks to utilize these measurements in public and
private decisionmaking. Consistent, rigorous analysis that is applied

393. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 311, at 9–19 (noting that the
United States “has a policy of denial for any license application to export specially designed
implements of torture and thumbscrews”); Press Release, U.N. Office in Belarus, Commission
Adopts Measures on Situations in Cuba, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and Approves Special Rapporteurs for Belarus and Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (Apr. 15, 2004), available at http://un.by/en/hr/releases/21-04-04-4.html.
394. Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 11, at 2.
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to all censoring countries, and that illuminates comparisons among
them, will improve the quality and perception of such decisions.
Filtering is increasingly normal, but it should not be seen as natural.
Instead, legal scholars should examine carefully, skeptically, and
thoughtfully calls to restrict access to information online.

